Dabanli, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal

On judicial review of an immigration adjudicator’s decision, the court must respect the adjudicator’s role as primary fact-finder. The court should not demand the level of reasoning expected in a formal court judgment. A decision remains lawful where the essential fact-finding and assessment of the evidence can be understood, even if the determination is succinct or imperfectly expressed. The critical question in an asylum appeal is whether the claimant faces a real risk of treatment sufficiently serious to amount to persecution on return. Permission to appeal should not be granted merely because the determination is open to criticism; the alleged errors must be sufficiently apparent and material to make the decision properly arguable.

The applicant, a Turkish Kurd, claimed asylum after previous short periods of detention in Turkey connected with alleged support for Dev Sol and attendance at a May Day demonstration.

An adjudicator dismissed his appeal, finding that he had not established past persecution or a sufficient risk of persecution on return. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s President refused permission to appeal. The Administrative Court, before Newman J, refused permission for judicial review, and permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was initially refused on the documents.

The renewed application concerned whether alleged defects in the adjudicator’s factual reasoning and treatment of the evidence were sufficiently serious to justify judicial review.

1. Application refused. Lord Justice Simon Brown held, with Lord Justice Latham agreeing, that the adjudicator’s decision could not properly be impugned on judicial review.
2. The critical issue was whether, assuming return to Turkey, the applicant would be ill-treated to a degree amounting to persecution. That was primarily a judgment for the adjudicator, who had heard the applicant’s evidence.
3. The adjudicator had been entitled to assess the risk by reference to the applicant’s low-level activities, the absence of any charge, the short periods of detention, and the evidence concerning the circumstances of his release. The adjudicator was entitled to conclude that significant past ill-treatment had not been established and that ill-treatment on return was extremely unlikely.
4. An immigration determination must be read with recognition that it is not a court judgment. It is unnecessary to require elaborate reasoning where the essential exercise of assessing the claimant’s evidence in the light of the objective material is apparent. Succinct or imperfectly expressed findings do not, without more, establish an error of law.
5. The challenge based on objective evidence no longer advanced in light of Avci [2002] EWCA Civ 977. The remaining contention that the defects were so obvious that the President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal should have identified them was untenable.

The renewed application was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused on 19 July 2002.
2. Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Newman J refused permission for judicial review on 25 February 2002.
3. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: the President refused permission to appeal on 8 August 2001.
4. Adjudicator: the applicant’s asylum appeal was dismissed on 28 June 2001.