AVCI v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Country material concerning the treatment of suspected supporters of an unlawful organisation must be considered in an asylum claim. It may support an account and inform the assessment of future risk. It does not, without more, create a presumption or prima facie case that a person detained by the authorities was tortured.

The assessment remains fact-sensitive. It depends particularly on the claimant’s credibility, actual or perceived political activity, and past treatment. Past persecution is cogent evidence of future risk unless circumstances have materially changed. An appellate court will not interfere with a credibility finding that has a rational cumulative basis, particularly where the first-instance tribunal heard the claimant’s oral evidence.

The appellant, a Turkish national of Kurdish Alevi background, claimed asylum on the basis of low-level support for the PKK. He alleged detention and torture by Turkish authorities after participating in pro-PKK activity.

An Adjudicator rejected the torture account and found that the appellant’s role was minor, that the authorities had no continuing interest in him, and that he lacked a well-founded fear of Convention persecution. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal. It also rejected the asserted occurrence of a demonstration in Istanbul in August 2000.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether country evidence made the rejection of his account of ill-treatment irrational, and whether the Tribunal’s treatment of the August 2000 demonstration affected the result.

Decision

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Dyson LJ gave the principal reasons. Country evidence concerning detention and ill-treatment of persons suspected of links with the PKK was important background material and was consistent with the appellant’s account. It did not, however, establish that his account of torture was true, create a presumption of torture, or make out a prima facie case in his favour.

2. The assessment of risk depended on the individual facts. Past persecution would be cogent evidence of a future risk in the absence of material change, which made the truth of the alleged detentions and torture central. The Adjudicator had rationally rejected that account on a cumulative assessment: the appellant’s very minor role, his release without charge, the absence of corroborating medical evidence, and wider credibility concerns. The absence of medical evidence would have been a weak sole reason, but it was not the sole reason.

3. The Tribunal was entitled to uphold the adverse credibility finding. Its consideration of country material did not undermine the Adjudicator’s findings. The appellate court attached weight to the fact that the Adjudicator had seen and heard the appellant give evidence.

4. Even assuming that the Tribunal had erred in overturning the finding that an August 2000 demonstration occurred, the error could not affect the outcome. The Tribunal had independently endorsed the decisive finding that the appellant was a low-level supporter in whom the authorities had no interest and who therefore lacked a well-founded fear of Convention persecution.

5. Brooke LJ considered that the Tribunal had inadequately explained its reversal of the demonstration finding and should have given the parties notice and invited submissions. He nevertheless agreed that this did not alter the outcome. Simon Brown LJ agreed with Dyson LJ. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, subject to the stated assessment directions.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal: [2002] EWCA Civ 977.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal — dismissed the appellant’s appeal in a decision promulgated on 16 October 2001.
• Adjudicator — dismissed the asylum appeal on 27 April 2001.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department — refused the asylum claim.