Secretary Of State For Trade And Industry v Selby

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success. An appellate court will interfere with a discretionary case-management decision only where the judge acted on a wrong legal basis, omitted a relevant matter, considered an irrelevant matter, or reached a plainly wrong result. A different weighting of the factors is insufficient. The prompt prosecution of appeals forms part of the proper administration of justice and may justify refusing to revive a stale appeal, even where the respondent suffers no particular prejudice. An order for costs will not necessarily provide a realistic alternative to striking out an appeal that has remained dormant for years.

Mr Selby sought permission to appeal against an order of Park J in the Companies Court, which struck out his long-standing appeal against a disqualification order made by the registrar under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. His appeal notice had been filed in December 1998 but had not been progressed. The disqualification period had expired in May 2001.

Park J refused to revive the appeal, having considered the delay, the handling of legal aid, the lack of full information provided to the Treasury Solicitor, the public interest in finality, and procedural deficiencies. Robert Walker LJ refused permission on the papers. The renewed application concerned whether Park J had wrongly exercised his discretion, particularly by failing to consider costs as an alternative sanction.

1. Application refused. The proposed appeal did not have a real prospect of success under Rule 52 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.
2. Park J had jurisdiction under the CPR to strike out an appeal that had become completely stale and whose continuation would be unsatisfactory and an abuse of process. His discretion was exercised after full argument on whether the appeal should proceed and after consideration of the relevant procedural and public-interest factors.
3. The appellate court may interfere with a discretionary decision only where it was made on a wrong legal basis, relevant matters were omitted, irrelevant matters were taken into account, or the decision was plainly wrong. Disagreement about the weight given to individual factors does not establish appealable error because discretion permits a range of permissible choices.
4. The judge was not required to adopt a costs order as an alternative. In the circumstances, costs would not have been a realistic means of dealing with an appeal left unprogressed for several years.
5. The absence of prejudice to the Secretary of State was not decisive. Expedition in the conduct of appeals, as in trials, may be enforced consistently with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is contrary to the proper administration of justice for appeals to remain dormant for years.
6. The court expressed no view on the merits or prospects of the underlying appeal against disqualification. Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) ([2002] EWCA Civ 1164): the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Robert Walker LJ had previously refused permission on the papers on 21 May 2002.
3. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Companies Court: Park J struck out the appeal notice on 15 April 2002.
4. Registrar: Mr Registrar Simmonds made a disqualification order for two and a half years on 25 November 1998.