Secretary Of State For Transport, Local Government & Regions v Hammond & Anor

For inappropriate development in the Green Belt, the decision-maker must ask whether very special circumstances overcome the general presumption against it and any additional harm. Where Green Belt policies are especially strong, the claimed need may have to be compelling. Applicants relying on the absence of alternative sites bear the burden of establishing that absence. On judicial review, an inspector’s decision should be read as a whole. The court should not interfere where the report engages with the material evidence and the conclusion falls within the range of lawful planning judgment. An inspector need not expressly mention every piece of evidence if the reasoning makes clear why it was not accepted.

The Secretary of State called in two retrospective applications for five-year planning permissions for off-airport car parks near Gatwick Airport. The sites were in the Green Belt, where car parking was inappropriate development. The Inspector recommended refusal, and the Secretary of State accepted that recommendation, finding no very special circumstances sufficient to justify the proposals.

Collins J quashed the refusals. He considered that the Inspector had failed to grapple with evidence of present and future parking need, the airport’s strategy, and the difficulty of finding alternative sites. The central issue on appeal was whether the Inspector’s report had lawfully considered the evidence and adequately explained the conclusions accepted by the Secretary of State.

1. Appeal allowed. Schiemann LJ gave the principal reasons. Buxton LJ agreed and added separate observations. Sir Murray Stuart-Smith agreed with their reasons. The order of Collins J was set aside, and the respondents’ costs were assessed at £14,142.
2. Car parking in the Green Belt was inappropriate development and therefore harmful. The decisive question was whether very special circumstances outweighed the general presumption against such development and the additional harm to openness, sustainability and the environment. Buxton LJ stated that, given the strong policy protection of the Green Belt, the relevant threshold was compelling need.
3. The Inspector had considered the evidence concerning the airport’s strategy, existing spare land, proposed additional spaces, future pressure on airport land and the airport’s assurance that it could meet its obligations. He was entitled to reject the proposition that the airport’s operational plans made off-airport parking necessary immediately. Those plans were not immutable, and future conflicts between competing uses could be addressed when they arose.
4. On the alternative-site issue, the burden lay on the applicants to establish that there was no suitable temporary or permanent site outside the Green Belt. The Inspector was entitled to conclude that this burden had not been discharged. Policy obstacles did not themselves establish that no alternative site existed.
5. Read as a whole, the Inspector’s report grappled with the question of need and explained why the evidence did not justify permission. The absence of an express reference to every aspect of a witness’s evidence did not make the reasoning unlawful. Collins J had impermissibly substituted his own assessment for a planning judgment that fell within the lawful range of decision-making.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2002] EWCA Civ 1176, the appeal was allowed and the order of Collins J was set aside.
2. Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division — Collins J quashed the Secretary of State’s refusals of the two planning applications.