Jones, R (on the application of) v Lord Chancellor's Department

[2002] EWCA Civ 119

Case details

Case citations
[2002] EWCA Civ 119
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
5 February 2002
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Judicial review Appellate jurisdiction
Keywords
permission to appeal judicial review original jurisdiction Divisional Court prosecutorial discretion irrationality duty to prosecute litigant in person
Outcome
application for permission to appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

The Court of Appeal has appellate, not original, jurisdiction. A fresh judicial review claim cannot be used to challenge an earlier Divisional Court decision; the proper route is an appeal. The court will not interfere with prosecuting authorities’ discretionary decisions unless they are unlawful or irrational. There is no general obligation to prosecute. Human-rights or European-law arguments do not themselves confer original jurisdiction or require a remedy through procedurally inappropriate proceedings.

Factual background

Mr Jones sought permission to appeal from the Divisional Court’s refusal, on 17 October 2001, to grant permission for judicial review. The proposed review concerned the police and Crown Prosecution Service decision not to investigate or prosecute allegations of blackmail and conspiracy arising from his dismissal by CSC Limited.

He had not appealed an earlier Divisional Court refusal of permission. Instead, he sought to have that decision judicially reviewed by the Divisional Court. He argued that the Court of Appeal should consider the matter afresh and provide a remedy based on European Treaties and the Human Rights Act. The central issues were whether the present proceedings could be used in that way and whether the original decision was arguably unlawful or irrational.

Held

  1. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed.
  2. The Divisional Court was not capable of judicially reviewing an earlier decision of the Divisional Court. The proper course was to seek permission to appeal that earlier decision to the Court of Appeal. The present court likewise had no original jurisdiction and could not provide the de novo remedy sought.
  3. Although procedural technicalities should not unnecessarily prevent justice, Mr Jones’s failure to appeal the original decision meant that the present application could only potentially be treated as an out-of-time challenge to it. Lord Justice Latham nevertheless examined the papers and the original decision.
  4. The prosecuting authorities’ decisions were matters of discretion. The court was satisfied that they were neither unlawful nor irrational and would not interfere with them. There was no obligation on the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute in the circumstances.
  5. A claim alleging conspiracy would need to be brought by a properly constituted substantive action against the alleged conspirators or the company. The High Court could provide an appropriate remedy if such a claim were established, but that possibility did not support the present proceedings.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 5 February 2002, Lord Justice Latham dismissed the application for permission to appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 119).
  2. Divisional Court, Queen’s Bench Division: On 17 October 2001, Lord Justice Tuckey and Mr Justice Silber refused permission to apply for judicial review of an earlier Divisional Court decision.
  3. Earlier Divisional Court: Lord Justice Schiemann and Mr Justice Poole refused permission, concluding that the prosecuting authorities’ decision was discretionary, lawful and not irrational.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
application for permission to appeal dismissed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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