Mohamed v London Borough Of Waltham Forest

On a second appeal from a County Court decision concerning homelessness assistance, permission should be granted only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. A judge reviewing a local authority’s decision on a Wednesbury basis must reach an independent conclusion. The judge is entitled to substitute the court’s conclusion where the authority’s decision is perverse or otherwise Wednesbury unreasonable. A prior interim ruling on arguable irrationality is not binding, although it must be considered. Whether continued occupation of accommodation is reasonable is ordinarily fact-dependent and does not, without more, establish an important point of principle or practice.

Katherine Mohamed applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest for homelessness assistance under the Housing Act 1996 after returning from Egypt with her son. The authority accepted that she was eligible, in priority need and had a local connection, but decided that she was intentionally homeless because it would have been reasonable for her to continue occupying accommodation in Cairo.

On appeal, His Honour Judge Bradbury held that the authority’s decision was perverse and quashed it, varying the decision so that Mrs Mohamed was homeless. The authority applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, relying on an earlier interim ruling and alleging that the County Court judge had unlawfully substituted his own factual assessment. The central questions were whether the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason, and whether the judge had been entitled to intervene on Wednesbury grounds.

1. Permission refused. The application was refused because the proposed appeal raised neither an important point of principle or practice nor another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The refusal was based on that permission threshold, rather than on an assessment that the appeal lacked a real prospect of success.
2. Under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, the County Court’s jurisdiction is akin to that of the High Court on judicial review: Nipa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2000] 1 WLR 306. The issue whether the authority acted irrationally was therefore properly approached on that basis.
3. An interim decision by another judge on whether a decision was arguably irrational is not binding on the judge determining the substantive matter. It must be taken into account, but the judge must decide the issue independently on the evidence and facts before the court.
4. The County Court judge did not merely substitute a factual opinion for that of the authority. He treated the authority’s conclusion that it was reasonable for Mrs Mohamed to continue occupying the Cairo accommodation as perverse. Where an authority acts in a Wednesbury unreasonable way, the judge is entitled, and required, to quash the decision.
5. Whether continued occupation is reasonable, particularly after the breakdown of a marriage where the accommodation is abroad, is fact-dependent. The circumstances did not establish a precedent or an important point of principle or practice warranting a second appeal.

• Bow County Court: His Honour Judge Bradbury, on 8 May 2002, held that the authority’s decision was perverse, quashed it and varied the decision so that Mrs Mohamed was treated as homeless.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused on 30 July 2002.