Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council

An appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 on a point of law includes the ordinary grounds of judicial review, including irrationality and inadequate reasons.

Accommodation need not have a particular degree of permanence before it can be reasonable to occupy it under section 175(3). Practical accessibility of overseas accommodation is material. Financial inability to travel to it may prevent it from defeating an application for homelessness assistance, but an authority need investigate that matter only where the applicant or the known circumstances raise it as a real issue.

Section 175(2)(a) concerns a physical impediment to entering premises. It does not cover an inability to travel to them.

Nipa Begum applied to Tower Hamlets for homelessness assistance after relatives in England could no longer accommodate her. The authority decided, and on review confirmed, that she was not homeless because she could live with her husband at her father-in-law’s home in Bangladesh.

His Honour Judge Platt in the Bow County Court quashed the review decision. He held that the County Court could review it for irrationality, but also held that the overseas accommodation required permanence, that the authority should have investigated her ability to fund travel to Bangladesh, and that inability to fund travel could amount to an inability to secure entry under section 175(2).

The authority appealed. The central issues were the scope of section 204, the construction of section 175, and the extent of the authority’s inquiry duty under section 184.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Court quashed the County Court order and confirmed the authority’s review decision.

2. Per Auld LJ, with Sedley LJ agreeing, an appeal on a point of law under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 includes the full judicial-review range of legal error. That includes irrationality and inadequate reasons. The County Court was therefore entitled to quash an unlawful or irrational review decision.

3. The County Court judge was wrong to treat permanence as a condition of accommodation which it is reasonable to continue to occupy under section 175(3). The statute imposes no such criterion. R v Brent LBC, ex p Awua [1996] 1 AC 55 showed that temporary accommodation may still reasonably be occupied, although physical suitability must be assessed in light of the expected duration of occupation.

4. All members agreed that an inability to afford travel to overseas accommodation can be legally material. Auld LJ, whose conclusion on the inquiry issue was joined by Stuart-Smith LJ, held that an authority need not investigate it routinely. Its duty is to make inquiries necessary in light of what the applicant has said and the circumstances known to it. Here, no statement or circumstance put the authority on inquiry about air fares. Sedley LJ agreed that the inquiry was sufficient, while locating practical accessibility within availability under section 175(1).

5. Section 175(2)(a) concerns a physical barrier to entering premises, such as unlawful exclusion or squatters. It does not treat financial inability to travel to premises as an inability to secure entry.

6. The judge had also substituted his own assessment for the proper review question. The authority had considered affordability of living in Bangladesh, family links, and local housing conditions. Its failure to pursue unraised issues about travel costs or Bangladeshi immigration law was not irrational. The review decision stood.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Allowed the authority’s appeal and confirmed its review decision: [1999] EWCA Civ 3051.
• Bow County Court His Honour Judge Platt had quashed the authority’s review decision under section 203 of the Housing Act 1996.