Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council

An appeal on a point of law under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 encompasses judicial review grounds, including irrationality, procedural error and inadequate reasons. Overseas accommodation must be accessible to the applicant. Financial inability to reach it is relevant, but an authority must investigate that difficulty only where the applicant raises it or the circumstances indicate a possible problem. Its duty is to make necessary inquiries, assessed against the information available, rather than exhaust every conceivable obstacle. Inability to secure entry under section 175(2)(a) concerns a physical barrier at the premises. Temporary tenure does not itself make continued occupation unreasonable. The court reviews the authority’s decision for lawfulness and irrationality rather than substituting its own assessment of reasonable occupation.

Nipa Begum, a British citizen with a young son, applied to Tower Hamlets London Borough Council for homelessness assistance after relatives in England told her that they could no longer accommodate them. Her husband lived in his father’s house in Bangladesh, where she and her son had previously stayed and had a room available. Following inquiries and a statutory review, the council concluded that this accommodation remained available and was reasonable for her to occupy.

Judge Platt, sitting in the Bow County Court, quashed the review decision on an appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. His reasons included failures to investigate travel costs and immigration entitlement, and irrationality in assessing continued occupation. The council appealed. The Court of Appeal considered the scope of the county court’s jurisdiction, the statutory meaning of available accommodation and inability to secure entry, and the extent of the council’s duty of inquiry.

Appeal allowed unanimously. The county court’s order was quashed and the council’s review decision confirmed.

1. Auld LJ, with the agreement of Sedley and Stuart-Smith LJJ, held that an appeal on any point of law under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 encompassed the grounds available on judicial review. These included irrationality, procedural error, vires and inadequate reasons. Parliament intended the county court to assume the principal supervisory role in homelessness decisions. The High Court retained a residual jurisdiction. Resort to that jurisdiction after expiry of the statutory appeal period should be confined to the most exceptional circumstances.

2. Sedley and Stuart-Smith LJJ preferred an analysis under which section 175(3) qualified accommodation already possessed. It did not require otherwise available accommodation to be disregarded merely because the applicant had never occupied it. They differed from Auld LJ’s reading of subsections (1) and (3) together. The difficulty of unfit accommodation never previously occupied was left unresolved. Stuart-Smith LJ considered that authorities should in practice assess whether accommodation was reasonable to occupy even where it had never been occupied.

3. The court agreed that accessibility mattered. Sedley and Stuart-Smith LJJ located that requirement in availability under section 175(1); Auld LJ treated inability to finance travel as relevant to reasonable occupation under section 175(3). Section 175(2)(a), however, concerned a physical barrier at the premises, such as squatters or illegal eviction, rather than difficulty travelling there.

4. Auld LJ, supported by Stuart-Smith LJ, held that necessary inquiries depended on the circumstances known to the authority. Financial inability to travel required investigation when raised by the applicant or indicated as a likely possibility. Authorities were not required routinely to exhaust every possible obstacle. The applicant’s repeated journeys, family support and opportunity to explain why she could not return justified the inquiries made. Her information likewise gave no reason for detailed investigation of her immigration entitlement. The judge should not have relied on that unraised issue in the manner he did.

5. Sedley LJ concurred on a narrower basis. He considered accessibility a potential problem requiring inquiry here, but accepted that the interview provided the necessary opportunity to raise it. The applicant’s account supported only the conclusion that travel remained possible. He emphasised that this conclusion depended on the particular interview and offered no general licence to omit accessibility inquiries.

6. The judge had substituted his assessment of reasonable occupation for the question whether a reasonable authority could have reached the decision. The council had considered affordability, family connections and local housing scarcity. On the academic question of permanence, the court also accepted the distinction in R v. Brent LBC, ex p. Awua [1996] 1 AC 55: temporary tenure alone did not make occupation unreasonable, although physical suitability depended on the duration of occupation. The appeal was allowed with costs.

• Court of Appeal: On 1 November 1999, unanimously allowed the council’s appeal, quashed the county court’s order and confirmed the council’s review decision. The case was reheard by three judges after an initial hearing before Auld and Sedley LJJ.
• Bow County Court: On 19 May 1998, Judge Platt allowed the applicant’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and quashed the council’s review decision.
• Local housing authority: On 27 November 1997, the council confirmed on statutory review its decision of 15 October 1997 that the applicant was not homeless.