Sabhya Bano, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Waltham Forest

A local housing authority’s main housing duty ceases automatically under section 193(7AA) of the Housing Act 1996 when a properly informed applicant accepts or refuses a private rented sector offer. The subsection requires neither a further decision by the authority nor notification that the duty has ended.

A decision in an offer letter that the duty will end on acceptance or refusal is reviewable under section 202(1)(b). A later confirmation that the duty has ceased is also reviewable. A defect in the offer may be raised through that process. Where the statutory review and County Court appeal procedure was available but was not used, judicial review should ordinarily be refused absent pressing or exceptional circumstances.

The Council accepted that it owed Mrs Bano the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. In June 2020, it offered her a private rented flat in Derby. She refused it. The offer letter explained the reapplication duty under section 195A(1), but did not explain the effect of section 195A(2).

After Norton established that such an omission made a private rented sector offer defective, Mrs Bano sought recognition that the main duty had continued. The Council refused. The Administrative Court declared that the duty remained owed, holding that the Council had made no effective decision ending it: [2024] EWHC 654 (Admin).

The Council appealed. The central issues were whether the duty ended automatically on refusal, whether Mrs Bano could have sought a statutory review of the offer or of the Council’s later position, and whether judicial review should nevertheless be available.

1. Appeal allowed; judicial review claim dismissed. The judge erred in treating the main housing duty as continuing unless and until the authority made a fresh decision after refusal of the private rented sector offer.

2. Section 193(7AA) of the Housing Act 1996 provides that the authority shall cease to be subject to the duty when an applicant who has received the prescribed written information accepts or refuses a private rented sector offer. Unlike section 193(5), neither section 193(7) nor section 193(7AA) requires notification that the authority regards the duty as ended. The natural reading is therefore that discharge is automatic when the statutory conditions are met.

3. Warsame did not determine the effect of the materially amended statutory wording. Ravichandran, properly understood, recognised that there could be automatic discharge and that a subsequent authority decision could be reviewable even if confirmatory of it. It also confirmed that an offer embodying a prospective decision that refusal will end the duty is reviewable under section 202(1)(b).

4. Mrs Bano could have requested a review both of the June 2020 offer and of the Council’s later conclusion that its duty had ceased. The offer letter was defective under Norton v Haringey [2022] EWCA Civ 1340, but that defect was capable of being raised in a statutory review. The Council’s correspondence and conduct after refusal sufficiently showed that it considered its duty at an end.

5. The statutory review and appeal route was the procedure Parliament intended for these challenges. Applying Glencore and Nipa Begum, no pressing or exceptional circumstances justified using judicial review after that route had not been pursued. The Council’s 2023 letter merely maintained its earlier position and was not an appropriate independent target for judicial review.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Council’s appeal and dismissed the judicial review claim: [2025] EWCA Civ 92.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Allowed Mrs Bano’s judicial review claim and declared that the Council continued to owe the main housing duty: [2024] EWHC 654 (Admin).