R (on the application of Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest

Under section 193(7AA) of the Housing Act 1996, a compliant private rented sector offer ends the main housing duty as a matter of law when the applicant accepts or refuses it. The authority need not make or notify a further decision. The notified offer is itself a reviewable decision that the duty will end upon acceptance or refusal.

The applicant normally has 21 days from notification to request a statutory review. A later communication which merely confirms that the duty ended does not create a new right or period of review. Subsequent substantive decisions remain separately challengeable where they fall within the statutory review scheme or, where they do not, by judicial review. A suitable statutory review and appeal procedure ordinarily precludes judicial review.

Waltham Forest accepted that it owed Mrs Bano the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. It later offered her private rented accommodation in Derby. The offer letter stated that acceptance or refusal would end the duty and informed her of rights of review, but omitted part of the information required by section 193(7AB)(c). Mrs Bano refused the offer and did not request a review within 21 days.

A Deputy High Court Judge held that the duty had not ended because the authority had made no subsequent decision that the offer had been refused: [2024] EWHC 654 (Admin); [2024] 1 WLR 3645. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the duty ended automatically and that statutory review had been an alternative remedy: [2025] EWCA Civ 92; [2025] 1 WLR 2557.

Although the appeal had become academic for Mrs Bano, the Supreme Court determined it because the statutory questions affected many similar cases. The principal issues were whether cessation under section 193(7AA) required a further notified decision, whether the offer letter was reviewable, and whether later confirmatory communications generated fresh review rights.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Stephens and Lady Rose delivered the joint judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lord Sales and Lord Hamblen agreed. Mrs Bano had a suitable alternative remedy under the statutory review scheme, which precluded her claim for judicial review.

2. On its plain and contextual meaning, section 193(7AA) of the Housing Act 1996 causes the main housing duty to end as a matter of law when an applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer. The subsection neither requires the authority to make a later decision recording acceptance or refusal nor requires notification of such a decision. This contrasts with section 193(5), which expressly requires notification. The legislative history and amended wording of section 193(7) supported the same automatic operation for a refusal of a final Part 6 offer.

3. The offer itself is the authority's decision, reviewable under section 202(1)(b), that the main duty will end upon acceptance or refusal. It is not merely an indication that a future decision might be made. Notification of the offer therefore supplies both the reviewable decision and the date from which the 21-day period in section 202(3) runs. Its suitability is also reviewable under section 202(1)(g). This construction preserves the approach to cessation decisions approved in Warsame v Hounslow London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 696.

4. An applicant must receive the offer before it can be accepted or refused. If the letter goes astray, the conditions for cessation are not met and the authority remains subject to the duty. Even if section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 might otherwise apply, section 193 discloses a contrary intention because actual receipt is necessary for acceptance or refusal.

5. The offer to Mrs Bano omitted the information about section 195A(2) required by section 193(7AB)(c). Consistently with Norton v Haringey London Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1340, that defect could have produced a successful review. Mrs Bano did not request a review within the statutory period, however, and the notified decision therefore stood as a valid decision bringing the duty to an end.

6. On the third ground, which was unnecessary to the disposition, a purely confirmatory later communication does not generate a new right of review. Treating it as reviewable would evade the statutory requirements of expedition and finality and deprive the authority of its discretion to extend time. The court therefore disapproved the contrary proposition associated with Ravichandran v Lewisham London Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 755. A later substantive decision may be reviewed if it independently falls within section 202(1)(a)–(h), or may otherwise be challenged by judicial review, but it cannot reopen the expired challenge to cessation of the main duty.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed Mrs Bano's appeal unanimously. It upheld the result reached by the Court of Appeal, while rejecting the proposition that later purely confirmatory communications generated fresh review rights: [2026] UKSC 22 .
2. Court of Appeal: Allowed Waltham Forest's appeal. It held that the main housing duty ceased automatically following refusal of the offer and that Mrs Bano had an available statutory review remedy: [2025] EWCA Civ 92 ; [2025] 1 WLR 2557 .
3. High Court, Administrative Court: At a rolled-up hearing, the Deputy High Court Judge accepted Mrs Bano's construction. He held that a further decision was required and that no statutory alternative remedy had been available: [2024] EWHC 654 (Admin) ; [2024] 1 WLR 3645 .