Mohamed Conde, R (on the application of) v The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea

A housing authority has a wide discretion under section 202(3) of the Housing Act 1996 to extend the period for requesting a review. Relevant considerations may include the length and explanation of the delay and the apparent merits of the proposed review, but the authority may attach such weight to them as it considers appropriate. It may refuse an extension without determining the merits where that is rational. Judicial review concerns the lawfulness of the refusal to extend time, rather than an appeal on the merits of the underlying housing decision. A short delay, revised housing information and genuine concerns about accommodation do not necessarily make refusal irrational. A review of a personalised housing plan does not, without a clear and unambiguous representation, create a legitimate expectation that the relief duty will not be discharged.

The claimant, a refugee with mental-health vulnerabilities, applied to the defendant local housing authority for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The authority made a final accommodation offer outside its borough and subsequently decided that its relief duty had ended because the claimant had refused the offer. The claimant disputed refusing it and sought a statutory review under section 202.

The request was made five days after the 21-day period. The authority refused to extend time, having considered the delay, the explanation, and briefly the apparent merits. The claimant sought judicial review, alleging irrationality and breach of legitimate expectation. The central issue was whether the refusal to entertain the out-of-time review was unlawful.

1. Claim refused. The challenge concerned only the decision not to extend time for a section 202 review. It was not an appeal against the underlying decision to treat the relief duty as discharged.
2. The discretion under section 202(3) of the Housing Act 1996 is wide. Relevant matters may include the length of delay, the reasons for it and the prospects of success on review. The authority may give those matters the weight it considers appropriate. It may rationally refuse an extension without considering the merits where the delay and explanation justify that course: C v London Borough of Lewisham [2003] EWCA Civ 927; R(Radhia Slaiman) v The London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames [2006] EWHC 329 (Admin).
3. The claimant’s factual dispute about whether he had refused the property could not be resolved on the evidence. Nevertheless, a review would not necessarily have succeeded. The authority could have concluded that his concerns implied a refusal, or that failure to accept positively within the time specified in the offer letter amounted to refusal.
4. The authority would have been required to consider the claimant’s later medical and support information and his son’s educational needs. But section 208(1) created no absolute right to accommodation within the authority’s borough. Nor was there evidence that the son could not continue at his school or attend a suitable alternative. Convention violations in homelessness decisions, including under Article 2 of the First Protocol, were likely to be very rare: Rabah Ghaoui v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2024] EWCA Civ 405.
5. The five-day delay, the social worker’s annual leave, the revised personalised housing plan and the claimant’s concerns did not require an extension. The authority could reasonably regard those matters as insufficient, particularly because the claimant had been advised to accept the offer and request a review of suitability.
6. Agreeing to revise the personalised housing plan did not amount to a clear and unambiguous representation that the authority would refrain from making a discharge decision. No legitimate expectation arose. The application was therefore refused.