Caroline Griffiths-Fowell, R (on the application of) v Birmingham City Council

For the purpose of section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996, accommodation is “made available” only where the authority has discharged its housing function under section 206(1). It must therefore be suitable. An applicant who leaves unsuitable accommodation does not thereby bring the main housing duty to an end.

Challenges within the statutory review-and-appeal scheme should ordinarily use that route, but judicial review remains available in exceptional circumstances. A local authority may be refused relief where it raises an alternative-remedy objection only after permission, evidence and preparation for a substantive hearing. Housing-suitability decisions are assessed by public law principles; on the evidence, a court may conclude that no reasonable authority could have found accommodation suitable.

Caroline Griffiths-Fowell, whose household included her disabled brother, was owed the main housing duty by Birmingham City Council. The council provided temporary accommodation at 7 Holden Close but accepted that important facilities were inaccessible and proposed adaptations. Those works were not completed within the estimated period.

After the respondent briefly occupied supported accommodation during a mental-health crisis, the council decided that its duty had ceased under section 193(6)(d) of the Housing Act 1996. The Administrative Court declared that the council had remained in breach of section 193(2) and made a mandatory order for suitable accommodation.

The council appealed. The central issues were whether the appeal was academic, whether judicial review should have been declined in favour of the statutory review and County Court appeal route, whether the judge used the correct public law standard, and whether section 193(6)(d) requires the accommodation to be suitable.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal remained live because the High Court’s declaration that the council had breached the main housing duty continued to bind the parties. The appeal against the mandatory order alone had become academic following the respondent’s changed circumstances, but that did not remove the live dispute about the declaration.
2. The court rejected the objection that judicial review should have been declined for want of an alternative remedy. The statutory route of review under section 202 and appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 is ordinarily the appropriate route for Part 7 challenges, and judicial review requires exceptional circumstances. However, the objection did not affect jurisdiction. The council had failed to raise it in summary grounds, detailed grounds of resistance, or until the day before the substantive hearing. In those exceptional circumstances, the judge’s decision to proceed was not erroneous.
3. The judge had, in substance, applied public law principles rather than substituted his own factual assessment. Read fairly and as a whole, his reasons addressed whether the council could reasonably regard the accommodation as suitable. In any event, on the evidence before him, the only reasonable conclusion was that 7 Holden Close was unsuitable until the remedial works and adaptations had been provided. The temporary arrangements could not reasonably be endured for the prolonged and uncertain period involved.
4. Section 193(6)(d) had to be read in the statutory context. Under section 206(1), an authority may discharge its Part 7 housing functions only by securing suitable accommodation. Accordingly, accommodation “made available” for the purposes of section 193(6)(d) means suitable accommodation made available in accordance with section 206. If an applicant voluntarily leaves unsuitable accommodation, the section 193(2) duty does not cease. That construction accords with section 193(6)(b), the intentional-homelessness provisions, and the other statutory mechanisms for ending the duty.
5. The judge was entitled to read the council’s letter of 4 June 2025 as accepting that the property, without adaptations, was inaccessible and unsuitable for a wheelchair user. The appeal therefore failed on every permitted ground.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the council’s appeal and upheld the declaration that it had breached the main housing duty: [2026] EWCA Civ 920 .
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court — HHJ Rawlings declared that the council had been and remained in breach of section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, and made a final mandatory order requiring suitable accommodation. The lower-court judgment citation was not stated in the judgment.