W (Children), Re

When determining a dispute about a child’s schooling, the court must apply the welfare principle and assess the children both individually and collectively by reference to the factors in Children Act 1989, section 1(3). A school move may be justified despite disruption from earlier family changes. The court must balance that disruption against practical advantages, longer-term stability and security, educational interests, sibling relationships and reliable financial arrangements. An appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s welfare discretion unless the decision was plainly wrong.

Separated parents with parental responsibility disputed the schooling of their three children. The father appealed from specific issue orders made by Bath County Court on 18 July 2002, requiring the eldest child to move from independent education to a state secondary school and the two younger children to change primary schools. The central issues were the weight to be given to educational interests, disruption, travel, family stability, catchment prospects and the father’s ability to fund private fees. The Court of Appeal considered whether the judge’s welfare assessment and exercise of discretion were plainly wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lady Justice Hale concluded that the orders were not plainly wrong. Lord Justice Keene agreed.
2. The court had to determine what was best for the children, considered both individually and collectively, applying the welfare factors in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. The parents’ continuing disagreement and any wider parental agenda could not displace that focus.
3. The effect of school change was an important consideration. Ordinarily, compelling reasons would be required for further disruption where children had already experienced parental separation, loss of their home and a recent school move. That was not an inflexible rule. The court had to weigh disruption against shorter travel, local friendships and activities, future school continuity, longer-term stability and security, sibling relationships and the circumstances of the family as a whole.
4. For the eldest child, immediate educational advantage and an assumed preference to remain at the preparatory school did not outweigh the absence of reliable evidence that private fees could be funded throughout his education. The money placed with solicitors established only the immediate year’s fees. There was no adequate evidence of sustainable income or dependable financial support from grandparents. Moving to the state sector then avoided raising expectations and allowed earlier integration.
5. For the younger children, the judge had been wrong to attach weight to the risk that remaining at their village school would jeopardise later admission to the Blue School. That error did not undermine the overall welfare assessment, because the other practical and longer-term factors continued to support the orders.
6. The court also observed that a specific issue order should determine the issue in dispute, rather than confer an exclusive decision-making right on one parent.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2002] EWCA Civ 1411, dismissed the father’s appeal.
• Bath County Court: His Honour Judge Ticehurst made specific issue orders on 18 July 2002 requiring the children to change schools.