Williams v London Borough Of Newham

Under Schedule 6 to the Road Traffic Act 1991, an application to extend time for serving a statutory declaration requires the court to decide whether, in the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to insist on the 21-day period. If that threshold is met, the court may allow an appropriate longer period. On appeal, the question is whether the refusal involved an error of law. A very late application supported by inadequate reasons may properly fail. A possible procedural injustice arising from an earlier enforcement step does not itself justify appellate intervention where the extension decision contains no legal error.

This was an appeal from His Honour Judge Richardson sitting at Bow County Court. On 12 July 2001 he refused Mr Williams’ application to set aside, or alternatively obtain permission to appeal against, Deputy District Judge Orr’s decision of 13 December 1999. The deputy district judge had refused an application to extend time for serving a statutory declaration concerning a road traffic enforcement debt.

Mr Williams alleged that the Notice to Owner had never been served. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the judge below had erred in law in concluding that the statutory criteria for extending the 21-day service period were not satisfied.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Dyson dismissed the appeal, expressed as an application, and made no order for costs.
2. Statutory inquiry. Schedule 6 paragraph 8(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1991 required the district judge to consider whether, in the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to insist on service of the statutory declaration within the permitted 21 days. If that condition was met, paragraph 8(4) gave the judge a discretion to allow such longer period as was appropriate.
3. Application of the criteria. The deputy district judge appeared to have dismissed the application on the mistaken basis that there was no power to extend time. The County Court judge, however, had considered the statutory criteria. Although his reasoning was not expressed by reference to detailed findings, he had to be taken to have concluded that Mr Williams came nowhere near showing that it was unreasonable to insist on the 21-day period, or that an extension was appropriate. The statutory declaration was very late, and the reasons given did not justify the delay. The declaration could be completed without witnesses.
4. Notice to Owner. The Court questioned the view that service of the Notice to Owner was irrelevant. If Mr Williams could establish that it had not been served, the subsequent statutory steps would be irrelevant and he would succeed on that issue. That observation did not determine the appeal, because the operative question was whether the refusal to extend time was legally erroneous.
5. Appellate intervention. The Court found no error of law in the County Court judge’s decision. It recognised that Mr Williams might have suffered a procedural injustice, but held that the Court could not provide a remedy in the absence of legal error in the decision under appeal.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2002] EWCA Civ 1519, Lord Justice Dyson dismissed the application on appeal and made no order for costs.
2. Bow County Court: On 12 July 2001, His Honour Judge Richardson refused the application to set aside, or alternatively for permission to appeal against, the earlier refusal to extend time.
3. Deputy District Judge: On 13 December 1999, Deputy District Judge Orr refused the application to serve the statutory declaration out of time.