Tasci v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal in an asylum case should be refused where the specialist fact-finding tribunals have reached detailed, reasoned credibility findings and no arguable error of law is shown. Inconsistencies and late disclosure may justify rejecting an applicant’s account, even where background evidence establishes that ill-treatment occurs in the country of origin. General evidence of police brutality or sexual violence cannot substitute for an account of personal experiences that has been disbelieved because it is inconsistent. Appellate intervention is unavailable merely because a different assessment of the evidence might have been possible.

Tasci v Secretary of State for the Home Department concerned a renewed application for permission to appeal against an Immigration Appeal Tribunal determination. The appellant, a Turkish citizen, claimed asylum on the basis of alleged PKK-related persecution, detention, ill-treatment and rape by security forces.

A special adjudicator rejected the rape and physical ill-treatment allegations, although accepting that brief detentions might have occurred. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal upheld the overall conclusions, despite the adjudicator’s limited reference to background evidence concerning Turkey. The central issue was whether the reasoning disclosed an arguable error of law warranting permission to appeal.

Lord Justice Buxton delivered the judgment, and Lord Justice Carnwath agreed. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. No arguable point of law. The adjudicator had considered the evidence in detail and was entitled to reject the allegations of rape and physical ill-treatment because of inconsistencies, late disclosure and implausibility. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal was likewise entitled to uphold those findings, having regard to the adjudicator’s opportunity to see and hear the appellant.
2. Background evidence. Although the adjudicator had not expressly placed the ill-treatment allegations in the context of the general situation in Turkey, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal addressed that omission and concluded that the overall reasoning remained sustainable.
3. The court adopted the reasoning that evidence of police brutality and rape in Turkey could not fill the evidential gap created where the applicant’s own account was disbelieved for inconsistency rather than because it was inherently incredible. Country evidence could not convert rejected personal evidence into proof of persecution.
4. Allegations of rape and other serious mistreatment were necessarily concerning, but the authorities applying the Immigration Rules had to decide whether the allegations were true. Both tribunals had reached clear, reasoned findings of fact, and there was no proper basis for appellate intervention. Permission was therefore refused.

• Special Adjudicator: On 13 December 2001, rejected the appellant’s allegations of rape and physical ill-treatment, accepted only the possibility of brief detentions, and found that she would not face persecution on return to Turkey.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: Granted permission to appeal and upheld the adjudicator’s conclusions, finding that the reasoning remained sustainable despite limited reference to background evidence.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused the renewed application for permission to appeal. The decision is reported at [2002] EWCA Civ 1583.