Goddard & Anor v Greenwood

A green traffic signal does not absolve a driver from taking reasonable care at a pedestrian crossing. Where the driver’s view is materially obscured, the circumstances may require anticipation that a pedestrian is present, particularly where the lights have only just changed and a stationary vehicle obscures the crossing. The duty remains fact-sensitive. No general rule requires a driver to stop or proceed at walking pace whenever a vehicle obstructs the view. A pedestrian who crosses against the lights without checking that it is safe may bear a very high degree of contributory negligence.

Heidi Goddard and Susan Walker appealed against an order made by His Honour Judge Poulton in the Canterbury County Court on 13 June 2002. The judge had entered judgment for David Greenwood in a liability-only claim arising from a road traffic accident at a signal-controlled pedestrian crossing.

The judge found that the traffic lights had turned green before Mr Greenwood crossed the junction. He nevertheless maintained a speed of about 25 mph while passing a stationary lorry, which materially obscured his view of the crossing. The appellants were crossing when it was unsafe to do so. The central issue was whether the driver remained liable despite having a green light.

Lord Justice Jonathan Parker delivered the leading judgment, with Lord Justice Clarke agreeing. The appeal was allowed to the extent that the respondent was held liable for 20 per cent of the recoverable damages.

1. Driver’s duty. A green light did not absolve the respondent from using reasonable care while proceeding across the crossing. His view was materially obscured by the stationary lorry.
2. Application to the facts. A reasonably careful driver in that situation would have anticipated that a pedestrian might be on the crossing. The case was materially different from the example of a lorry waiting in an outside lane to turn right. The lights had only just changed, and the lorry was stationary in the nearside lane. Maintaining speed while passing it therefore amounted to a breach of the duty to drive with reasonable care.
3. No general stopping rule. The decision was confined to its particular facts. It did not establish a general rule requiring traffic to stop or slow to walking pace whenever a stationary vehicle obscured part of a crossing.
4. Contributory negligence. The appellants’ conduct was of a very high order of carelessness. The judge’s assessment that they were 80 per cent contributorily negligent could not be faulted and would not in any event be disturbed on appeal.

Judgment was ordered for the appellants for 20 per cent of the recoverable damages. The respondent was ordered to pay the claimants’ costs up to 6 June 2002 and their costs of the appeal. The claimants were ordered to pay the respondent’s costs in the court below from 6 June 2002.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2002] EWCA Civ 1590; appeal allowed in part and judgment entered for the appellants for 20 per cent of the recoverable damages.
• Canterbury County Court: Order dated 13 June 2002; judgment entered for the respondent on liability, with the appellants’ claim dismissed.