Civita v Civita

For a second-tier appeal, permission requires either an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. A proposed appeal must also have a real prospect of success. Those requirements are not met where the lower court reached a decision to which it was plainly entitled on the material before it, and the application merely seeks further time in already prolonged enforcement proceedings.

The applicant sought permission for a second-tier appeal against the dismissal of his appeal concerning applications to suspend a warrant for possession. The warrant enforced an ancillary relief order requiring him to transfer and deliver possession of the matrimonial home to the respondent.

Limited permission had been granted below to appeal on practical difficulties in moving from the property. The lower appellate judge dismissed that appeal, finding that the application was a tactical attempt to gain more time and that there was no insuperable difficulty in obtaining alternative accommodation or moving the applicant’s belongings. The central issue was whether the statutory and procedural threshold for a further appeal was satisfied.

1. Applications refused. Permission to appeal and a stay of execution were refused.
2. As the proposed appeal was a second-tier appeal, section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and CPR Part 52.13 required the applicant to show either an important point of principle or practice or some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal.
3. The applicant relied on difficulties in relocating his possessions, his daughter’s broken ankle and unseasonal weather. Those matters disclosed neither a point of general importance nor a compelling reason. The history showed that he had had ample time to arrange rehousing and remove his possessions.
4. The lower appellate judge was plainly entitled, on the material before him, to conclude that there was no practical or insuperable difficulty in moving out or obtaining alternative accommodation. There was no basis for interference, and the proposed appeal therefore had no real prospect of success.
5. The second-tier permission threshold was not satisfied, so the requested stay was also refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2002] EWCA Civ 1734 — permission for a second-tier appeal and a stay of execution refused.
• Lewes County Court: The District Judge dismissed applications to suspend the warrant for possession. His Honour Judge Coltart granted limited permission to appeal, confined to practical problems in moving from the property, and then dismissed that appeal.
• Ancillary relief proceedings: An order required transfer and delivery of possession of the property to the respondent. Earlier applications for permission to appeal and for a stay were refused.