Quinland v Governor of Swaleside Prison

A prison governor is protected from liability for false imprisonment where detention is carried out under a warrant or court order that is good on its face and has not been set aside. The governor is not required to release a prisoner on the governor’s own assessment that detention has become unlawful.

Section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 protects responsibilities connected with the execution of judicial process. That expression includes implementation of the judicial process, not merely enforcement of judgments. Administrative failures by a court office in putting a judicial decision into effect may therefore fall within the Crown’s statutory immunity.

The claimant was convicted and sentenced to concurrent and consecutive terms which, correctly calculated, totalled two years and three months. The Crown Court warrant instead reflected two years and six months. Although a single judge directed that the sentence be corrected and the matter referred to the Full Court, the Criminal Appeal Office failed to make the referral promptly. The claimant was released six weeks later than the correct date.

He sued the prison governors and the Lord Chancellor’s Department for false imprisonment. District Judge Dudley struck out the claim, holding that the governors had acted under the warrant and that the Registrar was protected by section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. The central issues were the effect of the warrant and the scope of the statutory immunity.

Appeal dismissed. All three members of the court agreed that the claims had been properly struck out.

1. Prison governors. The governors had made no arithmetical or other error. They had detained the claimant in accordance with a warrant which was good on its face. The principles applied in Olotu v Home Office [1997] 1WLR 328 and Henderson v Preston (1888) 21 QBD 362 established that a governor acting within the terms of such a warrant is protected until it is set aside. The later decision in R v Governor of HMP Brockhill ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043 did not assist because it concerned a different situation involving a release-date calculation. The claim against the governors was therefore struck out.
2. Crown immunity. Section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 has two limbs. The second is not confined to enforcement of judgments or orders. “Execution of judicial process” includes implementation of the judicial process. The court followed the reasoning in Laura Wood v Lord Advocate [1996] SCLR 278. The Registrar’s responsibilities under section 21(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, including arranging the Full Court referral, were responsibilities connected with implementing judicial process. The failure to ensure timely referral was consequently within section 2(5), so the claim against the Lord Chancellor’s Department was also barred.
3. Other matters. It was unnecessary to decide whether the Registrar owed an actionable duty of care apart from section 2(5). The court held that the European Convention on Human Rights could not assist on facts predating the relevant legislative changes. Clarke LJ and Hale LJ left open whether the position might differ in a later case after section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 had come into force.

The court expressed regret that maladministration had caused six additional weeks’ imprisonment and hoped that compensation might be considered on an ex gratia basis. There was no order as to costs, subject to legal aid assessment. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal from the strike-out order and refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords.
• Southend County Court: District Judge Dudley struck out the claim against the prison governors and the Lord Chancellor’s Department on 20 July 2000. The appeal was later transferred to the Court of Appeal pursuant to Part 52.14 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.