Case details
Summary
A later authoritative judicial interpretation of a statute states what the law has always meant. An official cannot justify detention beyond the true statutory release date merely by showing that the detention accorded with earlier judicial decisions later held to be wrong.
False imprisonment depends on detention without lawful justification, not on fault. A prison governor may rely on a subsisting court order or warrant, but an earlier judicial construction of the law is not equivalent to such an order. The distinct protection afforded to officials enforcing apparently valid subordinate legislation does not extend to this situation.
Factual background
The appellant was serving concurrent sentences. Earlier Divisional Court authority led the prison governor to calculate her release date without aggregating all relevant periods spent on remand. A later Divisional Court decision held that construction of the statutory scheme to be wrong and declared that she should have been released 59 days earlier.
The appellant was released on 15 November 1996. The Divisional Court adjourned her claim for damages, but Collins J dismissed it on 10 June 1997 because the governor had correctly followed the earlier authorities and was blameless. The appeal concerned whether that reliance supplied lawful justification for the additional detention and, if not, the proper damages.
Held
Appeal allowed by a majority. Lord Woolf MR, with whom Judge LJ concurred in the result and essential reasoning, held that the appellant's 59 additional days in custody were unlawful and actionable as false imprisonment. Her lack of entitlement to an earlier release was not established by any subsisting court order. It depended solely on an earlier judicial interpretation of the statutory release provisions which had been authoritatively held wrong.
A judicial decision interpreting legislation operates retrospectively. It declares the meaning which the legislation has had throughout, even where it overrules a contrary earlier decision. The governor's honest and obligatory adherence to the earlier decisions could not convert the extra detention into lawful imprisonment. Fault and personal blameworthiness are not elements of the tort.
The court distinguished cases in which a governor detained a prisoner pursuant to a facially valid warrant or direct court order. Such an order may provide lawful justification until set aside. It also distinguished Percy v Hall [1996] QB 924, concerning constables enforcing apparently valid by-laws. The limited recognition given to an invalid administrative instrument does not permit an earlier, overruled judicial statement of law to remain correct for the purpose of a false-imprisonment claim.
Lord Woolf MR treated the reasoning under Article 5(1) and (5) of the European Convention of Human Rights as reinforcing the conclusion, although it was unnecessary to found the result on the Convention. Judge LJ added that extending the protection available to arresting officers to prison governors who miscalculate a completed sentence would materially reduce the protection afforded by the tort.
Roch LJ dissented on liability. He considered that a governor who followed the substantial body of then-authoritative Divisional Court authority had a defence of lawful justification. All members agreed that the £2,000 assessment was too low. The court substituted global damages of £5,000 and discouraged a daily or weekly tariff.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal: Allowed the appeal from Collins J on liability, substituted damages of £5,000, and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
- Queen's Bench Division: Collins J dismissed the appellant's claim for false-imprisonment damages on 10 June 1997.
- Divisional Court: Allowed judicial review and declared that the correct conditional release date was 17 September 1996: [1997] QB 443. The damages issue was adjourned.
Lower court decision
Appeal to higher court
Key cases cited
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