Edwards v Edwards

When a party seeks to adjourn family proceedings because of alleged psychiatric incapacity, the court must assess expert evidence alongside the full factual history and evidence challenging the incapacity or the party’s bona fides. It must fairly evaluate the opposing case and balance the likely consequences of granting or refusing the adjournment for both parties. The court may consider previous engagement with offered treatment and the prospects of useful progress by the proposed hearing date. The guiding principle is to bring stressful proceedings to conclusion at the earliest practicable date, since delay may prolong distress and postpone recovery.

Following the breakdown of the parties’ marriage, the husband sought an adjournment of ancillary relief proceedings on the ground that psychiatric illness left him unfit to litigate or give instructions. The wife alleged that his condition was being exaggerated as a litigation tactic and relied on the effect of further delay on her own health. The High Court accepted the psychiatric evidence and adjourned the substantive hearing to the first available date after 1 October 2003, while retaining the existing fixture for subsidiary issues. The wife appealed, arguing that the judge had treated the expert evidence as decisive and had failed to balance the consequences for both parties. The central issue was whether the adjournment application had been approached correctly.

The appeal was allowed with costs. The adjournment should have been refused.

1. Evaluation of evidence. Lord Justice Thorpe held that the issue whether the husband’s incapacity was genuine could not be determined solely from the opinions of the two doctors. Their assessments had been made without full knowledge of the wife’s evidence concerning the husband’s history and presentation. The judge therefore had to evaluate that evidence fairly, either accepting it or examining it critically after proper investigation.
2. Balancing consequences. The judge also had to balance the likely consequences of granting and refusing the adjournment. Refusal would impose further stress on the husband, but delay was likely to cause the wife’s already fragile condition to deteriorate, with medical evidence suggesting possible collapse. Recording sympathy for the wife without undertaking that balancing exercise was insufficient.
3. Prospects of progress and timing. The husband’s previous failure to accept available psychiatric treatment was a relevant consideration because there was a substantial risk that no useful progress would have occurred by the adjourned hearing. The guiding principle was that the court should do all in its power to bring highly stressful proceedings to a conclusion at the earliest possible date, since postponement delayed the parties’ opportunity for recovery.
4. Disposition. Applying those principles, Thorpe LJ concluded that the High Court had erred and that the application for adjournment should have been refused. Lord Justice Jonathan Parker agreed with Thorpe LJ’s reasons and proposed order. The order requiring the attendance of the second respondent was to stand, subject to an application for its discharge or variation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2002] EWCA Civ 1802, allowed the wife’s appeal with costs and held that the adjournment application should have been refused.
• High Court of Justice, Family Division: Her Honour Judge Darwell-Smith accepted the psychiatric evidence and adjourned the ancillary relief hearing to the first available date after 1 October 2003, retaining the existing fixture for subsidiary issues.