Secretary of State for Health v Beeson, Personal Representative of

Article 6(1) applies to a statutory residential-care scheme because decisions about the premises which an individual may occupy as a home, and the terms of occupation, affect private-law rights in the extended Convention sense.

Compliance must be assessed across the statutory process as a whole. A first-instance body need not itself meet every requirement of independence where its procedures can be expected to produce fair and reasonable decisions and judicial review supplies adequate independent control. Judicial review will usually suffice for schemes involving administrative judgment, discretion, policy and the allocation of public resources. Greater independent fact-finding may be required where a scheme generally or systematically turns on primary factual disputes.

A local authority decided that an elderly resident had transferred his home to his son for the purpose of reducing the amount payable for residential accommodation. It therefore treated the house as notional capital under regulation 25(1) of the National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations 1992.

Richards J quashed that decision because the authority had not clearly applied the required subjective-purpose test. That conclusion was not appealed. He also held that Article 6(1) applied and that judicial review did not cure the lack of independence in the complaints process.

The Secretary of State appealed on the Convention issues. The resident's personal representatives cross-appealed on whether a wholly independent complaints panel would itself be sufficient, since the panel made only recommendations and the Director of Social Services took the final decision.

1. Appeal allowed. Laws LJ, delivering the judgment of the court, held that Article 6(1) applied, but that the complaints procedure combined with judicial review satisfied its requirements. The unchallenged order quashing the authority's decision for failure clearly to apply regulation 25(1) remained unaffected.

2. The statutory residential-care scheme had to be examined as a whole. It was too narrow to isolate the means-testing decision or to describe the relevant civil right merely as a right to a rebate. The process determined what premises the individual would occupy as a home and on what terms. It therefore affected private-law rights within the extended meaning given to “civil rights and obligations” by Article 6(1).

3. The required intensity of independent review depends on the nature of the statutory scheme. Schemes which generally or systematically require findings of primary fact may require procedures resembling conventional judicial fact-finding. Schemes involving judgment, discretion, policy, scarce resources and the interests of third parties may properly entrust initial decisions to the administering public body, with judicial review providing sufficient independent control.

4. The absence of full independence at the initial stage did not render that process valueless. The relevant question was whether the process could be expected to produce fair and reasonable decisions and whether judicial review adequately secured legality and fairness. There was no substantial reason to doubt the objective integrity of the panel or the Director, despite the appearance created by two councillors sitting on the panel.

5. The National Assistance Act 1948 scheme involved substantial evaluative questions about need, available accommodation and the allocation of public resources. Although the particular dispute included credibility issues, an individual case's factual complexity did not require a generally applicable right to full independent rehearing on the facts. Special circumstances in another case might nevertheless require closer scrutiny.

6. The cross-appeal would have been dismissed. A wholly independent panel, combined with judicial review, would have satisfied Article 6 even though the Director formally made the final decision, because public law would closely constrain the Director by reference to the panel's recommendation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The Secretary of State's appeal was allowed. The court held that the complaints procedure, the Director's decision and judicial review together complied with Article 6(1). The cross-appeal would have been dismissed.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Richards J quashed the local authority's decision because it had not clearly applied the subjective-purpose test under regulation 25(1) of the National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations 1992. He also held that Article 6(1) applied and that judicial review did not cure the lack of independence in the complaints process. No citation is stated.