Hyde v Hyde

For the divorce fact under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 1(2)(b), the question is relational and petitioner-specific: whether, in the circumstances, the respondent’s behaviour makes it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to continue living with the respondent. The inquiry is not whether the respondent acted unreasonably, was at fault or was to blame. The fact may be established even where behaviour results from disorder, character, brain damage, personality clash or misunderstandings. It is not a moral or religious judgment. On permission to appeal, the Court of Appeal will not reassess trial findings where it did not hear the evidence and the proposed appeal has no prospect of success. An extension of time should be granted only where the merits are extremely good.

The wife sought permission to appeal, together with a substantial extension of time, against a decree nisi pronounced by His Honour Judge Tyzack QC in the Exeter County Court on 21 May 2002 in defended divorce proceedings. The husband’s petition relied on section 1(2)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, alleging that the wife’s behaviour made it unreasonable to expect him to live with her.

The trial judge made findings favourable to the husband. The wife challenged the assessment of her evidence, the description of her character and psychological condition, and the failure to obtain medical notes. The central issues were whether an extension of time should be granted and whether the proposed appeal had any realistic prospect of success.

Applications refused. Lady Justice Hale refused the wife’s application for an extension of time and permission to appeal. There was no order for costs, and the transcript was to be provided at public expense.

1. Extension of time. The husband had obtained a decree nisi and was entitled to seek his decree absolute. He also planned to remarry. Although the court had to act fairly to both parties, defended divorce proceedings had to be brought to a conclusion as quickly as reasonably possible. An extension should not be granted unless the merits of the permission application were extremely good.
2. The statutory test. English law has one ground for divorce, namely irretrievable breakdown, and a decree cannot be granted unless one of the statutory facts is established. Under section 1(2)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the question was whether the wife had behaved in such a way that the husband could not reasonably be expected to live with her. That was different from asking whether she had behaved unreasonably, or whether she was at fault or to blame. The conduct did not have to be the sole or main reason for the breakdown.
3. Nature of the behaviour. The statutory fact could be established even where the behaviour resulted from mental or physical disorder, basic character, permanent brain damage, a clash of personalities or misunderstandings. The court had to consider the effect of the behaviour on the particular petitioner and the circumstances of the relationship. The inquiry was secular and involved no moral or religious judgment.
4. Appellate restraint. The Court of Appeal had not heard the evidence or seen the parties give evidence. It therefore had no proper basis to interfere with the trial judge’s factual assessment. The marriage had irretrievably broken down, and the proposed appeal had no prospect of success.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2002] EWCA Civ 1826, the wife’s applications for an extension of time and permission to appeal were refused.
• Exeter County Court: His Honour Judge Tyzack QC pronounced a decree nisi on 21 May 2002 in defended divorce proceedings based on section 1(2)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.