Carney, R (on the application of) v North Lincs Council

A court may refuse a substantial extension of time for an application requiring a lower court judge to state a case where the delay is not justified. The public interest in finality, efficient use of court time and certainty for litigants supports observance of time limits. A trial judge is entitled to assess the evidence, make findings of fact and reach conclusions. Mere disagreement with those conclusions, later-discovered documents or strong conviction that the decision was wrong does not itself establish an arguable public-law ground or injustice.

John Carney sought permission to appeal against Hooper J’s refusal on 29 August 2001 of permission to apply for judicial review. The proposed review challenged His Honour Judge Heath’s refusal to extend time for an application that he should state a case concerning an earlier county court decision on a road-maintenance application under section 56(2) of the Highways Act 1980.

Silber J had refused permission on paper, and the application was renewed before Hooper J and refused orally. The central issues were whether the delay justified an extension and whether there was any arguable public-law ground for challenging the county court judge’s decision.

Lord Justice Pill, giving the sole judgment, refused permission to appeal.

1. Role of the trial judge. The county court judge had heard the case over several days, inspected the site, considered documentary and oral evidence, and made findings about the historical status of the road. Under the ordinary allocation of judicial functions, assessment of evidence, findings of fact and conclusions on that evidence were matters for the trial judge. Nothing placed before the Court of Appeal showed that the judge had reached an erroneous conclusion or that the decision disclosed an arguable public-law ground.
2. Delay and finality. Judge Heath was entitled to decline to state a case because he was unwilling, in the circumstances, to grant the substantial extension of time sought. The fact that the applicant had taken considerable time to obtain further plans and documents did not justify the delay. The public interest in finality, the proper use of court time and certainty for those affected by litigation explained why time limits should generally be observed.
3. Merits and injustice. The applicant had already had the opportunity to present his case at a lengthy hearing. Although the Court recognised the work undertaken and the sincerity of his concerns, no material indicated that the underlying decision was wrong or that any injustice had occurred. The refusal to extend time therefore could not arguably be described as perverse.
4. Order. The application was refused. Permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 8 February 2002, the application for permission to appeal was refused: [2002] EWCA Civ 186.
• Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): Silber J refused permission to apply for judicial review on paper. On renewal, Hooper J refused permission on 29 August 2001.
• Grimsby County Court: His Honour Judge Heath refused on 3 October 2000 to extend time for an application that he should state a case, following his decision of 16 May 2000 on an application under section 56(2) of the Highways Act 1980.