Peakviewing (Interactive) Limited & Ors v Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport

Where legislation provides that a High Court decision is final, the decision is not appealable to the Court of Appeal unless the statutory context clearly indicates otherwise. The Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction under section 16(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is expressly subject to restrictions imposed by other legislation. Section 18(1)(c) confirms that no appeal lies from a decision made final by statute. A statutory provision allowing an aggrieved person to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision before a High Court judge may encompass both merits and legal grounds, but the High Court’s decision remains final where the statute so provides. The Court of Appeal followed the approach in In re Racal Communications and rejected reliance on the contrary dictum in Pearlman v Harrow School.

The appellants applied under Schedule 1 to the Films Act 1985 after the Secretary of State refused to certify certain films as British films. Lawrence Collins J considered the application under paragraph 9 of that Schedule and granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The parties later questioned whether that permission was effective because paragraph 9 provided that the High Court’s decision was final. The central issue was whether the statutory finality provision barred an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

1. Appeal refused. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was also refused. Costs were to follow the event.
2. Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Films Act 1985 provides that a person aggrieved by the Secretary of State’s refusal may apply to the High Court, and that the decision of that court shall be final. The provision permits the High Court to consider both the merits of the Secretary of State’s decision and the legal approach adopted, but it makes the High Court’s decision final.
3. Section 16(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 gives the Court of Appeal jurisdiction over High Court judgments and orders only subject to contrary statutory provisions. Section 18(1)(c) expressly provides that no appeal lies from a decision made final by any Act.
4. Lord Denning MR’s broad observation in Pearlman v Harrow School, concerning an appeal despite statutory finality wording, was obiter and was treated as unreliable in In re Racal Communications. The court accepted the guidance in the latter decision.
5. The approach in Re Austintel, that the word final left no room for argument in the relevant statutory context, supported the same conclusion. No appeal lay from Lawrence Collins J’s decision, and the permission granted below was ineffective.

• High Court, Administrative Court and Divisional Court: Lawrence Collins J determined the appellants’ application under Schedule 1 to the Films Act 1985 and granted permission to appeal.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court held that paragraph 9 made the High Court decision final, refused the appeal, refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords, and ordered costs to follow the event.