Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School

A statutory provision making a county court’s determination final and conclusive does not protect a purported determination made outside the court’s jurisdiction. Where a court exercising a specially conferred statutory power misconstrues its mandate and consequently answers the wrong question, its decision is a nullity and may be quashed by certiorari.

For Schedule 8 to the Housing Act 1974, “structural” concerns the fabric of the house rather than merely the provision of equipment. A permanently integrated central-heating system, involving substantial work to walls, floors, ceilings, chimney and utility installations, amounts to a structural alteration or addition.

The tenant held a long lease of a London house whose rateable value exceeded the ceiling for acquiring the freehold under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. He sought a notional reduction under Schedule 8 to the Housing Act 1974, relying on a central-heating system installed at his expense.

The county court determined that the works did not amount to a structural alteration, extension or addition. Its determination was declared final and conclusive by Schedule 8 paragraph 2(2). The matter reached the Court of Appeal from the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court.

The issues were whether the heating installation satisfied Schedule 8 and whether certiorari or an appeal remained available despite the statutory finality provision and section 107 of the County Courts Act 1959.

1. By a majority, the appeal was allowed. Lord Denning MR and Eveleigh LJ held that the county court’s determination should be quashed and the matter remitted for determination of the remaining Schedule 8 matters. Geoffrey Lane LJ dissented on jurisdiction, although all three members of the court considered the county court’s construction of Schedule 8 erroneous.

2. The installation was an improvement effected by works amounting to structural alteration or addition. Geoffrey Lane LJ explained that “structural” concerned the fabric of the house, as distinct from the mere provision of equipment. The system was permanently connected to the gas, water and electrical installations; pipes passed through walls, floors and ceilings; and the chimney was altered and lined. Eveleigh LJ similarly treated the fabric as the constituent parts of the house considered as a complex whole. The earlier Settled Land Acts cases arose under different statutory language and in a different context.

3. The words “final and conclusive” excluded an ordinary appeal against a valid determination. They did not protect a purported determination which was a nullity because the county court had exceeded its jurisdiction. The supervisory jurisdiction therefore remained available where the statutory adjudicator answered a question other than the one Parliament had committed to it.

4. Applying Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147, the majority held that the county court had misunderstood the statutory expression defining the limits of its task. Per Eveleigh LJ, determining the proper meaning of that expression was collateral to the factual merits. By adopting the wrong meaning, the judge answered the wrong question and produced no binding statutory determination.

5. Lord Denning MR additionally considered that sections 107 and 108 of the County Courts Act 1959 were confined to jurisdiction conferred by that Act and did not govern new jurisdiction conferred by later legislation. He stated more broadly that a decisive error of law should be treated as jurisdictional. That broader formulation was not adopted by Geoffrey Lane LJ and was unnecessary to Eveleigh LJ’s narrower reasoning.

6. Geoffrey Lane LJ would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, the county court had considered the precise statutory question remitted to it and had merely reached a wrong conclusion within its jurisdiction. Section 107 removed certiorari for an error of law on the face of a completed county court judgment, while Schedule 8 excluded an appeal on law.

1. Court of Appeal: By a majority, allowed the appeal, quashed the county court determination, declared that the improvement fell within Schedule 8 to the Housing Act 1974, and remitted the remaining matters to the county court. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted.

2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Divisional Court: This was the court from which the appeal was brought. Its order and citation are not stated in the judgment.

3. County court: Refused the tenant’s application on 26 November 1976, determining that the central-heating works were not structural alterations, extensions or additions within Schedule 8.