Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox

The expression “member of the tenant’s family” in rent legislation bears its ordinary and popular meaning. That meaning may develop as social attitudes change and is not confined to relationships created by blood or lawful marriage.

A stable and permanent unmarried partnership may constitute a family relationship, whether or not the couple have children. Casual, intermittent or apparently impermanent relationships do not ordinarily qualify. An earlier decision concerning the popular meaning of an ordinary statutory word does not govern indefinitely where that meaning has materially changed.

The defendant lived with the tenant as his wife for 21 years, although they never married and had no children. After his death in 1961, she remained in the house and continued paying rent. The landlords later discovered that she was not his legal widow and obtained a county court possession order.

The county court considered itself bound by Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328. The defendant appealed. The questions were whether that authority legally precluded her from succeeding to the statutory tenancy and whether she was a “member of the tenant’s family” within the rent legislation.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The defendant was a member of the tenant’s family and succeeded to the protection of the Rent Acts. Judgment was entered for the defendant and no possession order was made.
2. Lord Denning MR, James LJ and Bridge LJ agreed that “family” bears its ordinary and popular meaning. That meaning is not confined to blood relationships or relationships created by marriage. It may change as social conditions and ordinary usage develop.
3. The ordinary understanding of family had developed since Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328. A couple living together as man and wife in a stable and permanent relationship may be members of one family even though they are unmarried and have no children. James LJ cautioned that casual, intermittent or apparently impermanent relationships fall outside that concept. Bridge LJ similarly required an appropriate degree of apparent permanence and stability.
4. Gammans v Ekins did not prevent that conclusion. Lord Denning MR considered that it could not stand with the subsequent House of Lords decision in Cozens v Brutus [1973] AC 854. James LJ treated Gammans as binding only upon the popular meaning of “family” in 1949. Bridge LJ reasoned that a decision about the ordinary meaning of language before a material social change should not continue to bind after that change.
5. Lord Denning MR further reasoned that the application of an ordinary statutory word in its popular sense is principally for the tribunal of fact. An appellate court should intervene only where no tribunal acquainted with ordinary language could reasonably have reached the decision. He nevertheless considered that consistent treatment of recurring facts may require the Court of Appeal to give a definite ruling.
6. Although the tenant died in 1961, the modern meaning was applied. James LJ considered it unduly rigid to deny the changed understanding merely because no precise year could be assigned to the change. Bridge LJ held that a plain modern meaning could be applied retrospectively unless the court was satisfied that it would have been unacceptable at the relevant date.

1. Court of Appeal: The defendant’s appeal was allowed unanimously. Judgment was entered for the defendant, the possession order was discharged, and the defendant received her costs in the Court of Appeal and below. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. Bromley County Court: His Honour Judge Fife held that Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328 bound him to find that the defendant was not a member of the tenant’s family. He ordered possession within 28 days.