Cozens v Brutus (Brutus v Cozens)

Where a statute uses an ordinary English word without indicating a special meaning, the word bears its ordinary meaning. Whether proved facts fall within that meaning is generally a question of fact for the tribunal. Appellate intervention is confined to misdirection or a conclusion which no tribunal acquainted with ordinary usage could reasonably reach.

Under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, conduct likely to cause annoyance, resentment, protest or a breach of the peace is not thereby insulting. Its threatening, abusive or insulting character must be proved separately. A court must not enlarge a criminal offence by substituting a wider judicial definition for Parliament’s ordinary language.

The appellant entered a court during the Wimbledon tennis tournament, blew a whistle, scattered leaflets and participated in a short demonstration against South African apartheid. Spectators became angry and some attempted to strike him as the police removed him. He was charged under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 with using insulting behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned.

The magistrates dismissed the information without calling on the appellant. They found that his behaviour was not insulting and therefore did not decide the remaining issues. On a case stated, the Divisional Court set aside that decision and remitted the case. It held that behaviour affronting others, showing disrespect or contempt for their rights, and foreseeably causing resentment or protest was insulting for the purposes of section 5.

The central issues before the House were whether that formulation was correct and whether the magistrates were legally bound to find the appellant’s conduct insulting.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously allowed the appeal. Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Kilbrandon gave reasons. Lord Diplock agreed that the appeal should be allowed.

2. Ordinary statutory language. Per Lord Reid, the proper construction of a statute is a question of law, but the meaning of an ordinary English word is not ordinarily a question of law. No context in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 indicated that “insulting” carried a special meaning. Lord Morris, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Kilbrandon took the same approach. The word was therefore to be understood in its ordinary and natural sense.

3. Fact-finding and review. Whether the proved conduct fell within that ordinary meaning was for the magistrates, applying rational judgment and common sense. Their decision could be disturbed for a legal misdirection or if no tribunal acquainted with ordinary language could reasonably have reached it. The magistrates had not misdirected themselves, and the conduct was capable of more than one factual characterisation.

4. No judicial enlargement of the offence. Per Lord Reid and Lord Morris, a court should not substitute synonyms or formulate a definition which limits or expands an ordinary statutory word. Few words are exact synonyms, and the Divisional Court’s formulation enlarged the scope of a criminal offence beyond the language enacted by Parliament.

5. Separate statutory requirements. Per Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne, section 5 did not criminalise every kind of conduct likely to occasion a breach of the peace. Conduct showing disrespect for rights, or causing annoyance, resentment or protest, was not necessarily threatening, abusive or insulting. Those characteristics had to be established separately. Viscount Dilhorne added that the spectators’ reaction could be relevant to whether a breach of the peace was likely, but not to whether the conduct itself was threatening, abusive or insulting. The distinction between annoyance and insult was consistent with Bryan v Robinson [1960] 2 All E.R. 173.

6. The facts did not compel a finding of insulting behaviour as a matter of law. Lord Reid added, without needing to decide the factual issue himself, that the conduct was deplorable but did not insult the spectators. The Divisional Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with costs.

1. House of Lords: In Cozens v Brutus (Brutus v Cozens) [1972] UKHL 6, [1973] AC 854, the House unanimously allowed the appeal with costs and set aside the Divisional Court’s order, leaving the magistrates’ dismissal in place.

2. High Court, Divisional Court: On a case stated, the court set aside the magistrates’ decision and remitted the case for the hearing to continue. It certified a point of law of general public importance concerning the meaning of insulting behaviour under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936.

3. Wimbledon magistrates: The magistrates found that the appellant’s conduct was not insulting and dismissed the information without calling upon him to answer the prosecution case.