R v Sheikh and others

Liability for allowing serious physical harm under section 5(1)(d) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 requires separate proof of each statutory safeguard. Under section 5(1)(d)(iii), the issue is whether the harmful act occurred in circumstances of a kind which the defendant foresaw or ought to have foreseen. The focus is on the circumstances, not foreseeability of the act or method of harm.

The circumstances need not be identical to those surrounding earlier violence. The nature and mechanism of the later act remain relevant, but a difference between the earlier and later methods is not decisive. The jury must consider all the evidence and apply the statutory words in their ordinary meaning. Awareness of a general risk of domestic violence does not automatically satisfy section 5(1)(d)(iii).

The respondents were convicted at Leeds Crown Court of causing or allowing a vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical harm, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. The prosecution alleged that a household member had deliberately caused catastrophic brain injury to the victim after she had previously sustained a caustic injury and serious neglect. It could not identify which household member committed either act.

The Court of Appeal, in R v Sheikh and others [2025] EWCA Crim 38; [2025] 1 WLR 2924, allowed the respondents’ appeals and quashed their convictions. It considered the later administration of glimepiride utterly different from the earlier sacral injury and held that the trial judge should have withdrawn the charges from the jury.

The prosecution appealed. The central issue was whether that difference necessarily prevented a jury from finding that the later act occurred in circumstances of a kind which the respondents foresaw or ought to have foreseen under section 5(1)(d)(iii).

1. Disposition. The prosecution’s appeal was allowed unanimously. Lord Lloyd-Jones delivered the judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lord Burrows, Lady Rose and Lady Simler agreed. The Court of Appeal’s order was set aside and the respondents’ convictions on counts 1 to 3 and 5 were reinstated.
2. The statutory requirements remain distinct. To convict on the basis that a defendant allowed a vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical harm, the prosecution must prove each requirement in section 5(1)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to the criminal standard. Section 5(1)(d)(iii) provides additional protection and is not automatically satisfied merely because the defendant knew, or ought to have known, of a significant risk of serious physical harm and failed to take reasonable protective steps.
3. Foreseeability concerns the circumstances. Section 5(1)(d)(iii) focuses on whether the act occurred in circumstances of a kind which the defendant foresaw or ought to have foreseen. It does not require foresight of the act, kind of act or precise mechanism of injury. The circumstances need not be identical to those surrounding the antecedent violence. Nor must there be a precise correspondence between the circumstances creating awareness of the risk and those surrounding the later act. This construction accords with R v Uzma Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 2; [2009] 1 WLR 2036 and the protective purpose of the legislation.
4. The mechanism of harm remains relevant but is not decisive. Depending on the facts, the nature of the act and its mechanism may form part of the relevant circumstances. A difference between the antecedent and subsequent methods of injury is only one consideration. The Court of Appeal erred by treating the radically different mechanisms as dispositive and by excluding wider evidence of hostility, prior injury, neglect, isolation and delayed medical assistance. There was evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the drug was administered in foreseen or foreseeable circumstances.
5. Directions to the jury. Whether ordinary statutory words cover proved facts is generally a factual question for the tribunal, consistently with Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854. The judge correctly directed the jury in the statutory language, required separate consideration of each defendant and fairly summarised the competing cases. Paraphrasing the expression “circumstances of the kind”, or adding hypothetical examples, would have risked substituting different words for Parliament’s language.
6. Further criticisms. A section 5 prosecution may proceed where one of several specified unnatural and unlawful acts caused the harm, provided the jury is sure to the criminal standard that an unlawful act did so. The possible causes were fairly presented, and a separate direction concerning section 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 was unnecessary. The rarity of glimepiride being used as a weapon did not determine foreseeability because the statutory focus was not foreseeability of that particular act.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: In R v Sheikh and others [2026] UKSC 28 , the prosecution’s appeal was allowed unanimously. The Court of Appeal’s order was set aside and the convictions on counts 1 to 3 and 5 were reinstated.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In R v Sheikh and others [2025] EWCA Crim 38 ; [2025] 1 WLR 2924 , the respondents’ appeals were allowed and their convictions under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 were quashed.
3. Leeds Crown Court: On 18 December 2023, following a trial before Lambert J and a jury, the respondents were convicted of causing or allowing a vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical harm and of related offences concerning the concealment of the victim’s condition.