Ragan v Chaytor & Anor

Permission to appeal against a case-management decision should be refused where there is no realistic prospect of showing that the lower court exercised its discretion improperly. An application to adjourn requires the court to balance the applicant’s ability to present the case fairly against delay, wasted costs and the procedural history. A judge is under no duty to inform a litigant of a right to appeal. A later compromise may also remove any practical benefit from an appeal unless the settlement preserves that right.

The claimant brought contractual and related claims concerning alleged consultancy and share-option arrangements. Shortly before trial, withdrawal of Legal Services Commission funding left him acting in person. He sought an adjournment of indefinite duration so that he could raise funds and prepare the case. His health and the unequal representation were also relied upon.

His Honour Judge McGonigal refused the adjournment, concluding that the claimant knew the case well and could represent himself, with assistance from the court on legal points. The claimant sought permission to appeal, complaining both about the refusal and about the judge’s failure to inform him of a right of appeal. After the refusal, he compromised the proceedings by abandoning his claim and accepting reciprocal abandonment of the defendants’ claims. The central issues were whether the adjournment decision was susceptible to appellate interference and whether any appeal remained practically available after the compromise.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Adjournment. The decision whether to adjourn was a matter for the trial judge’s discretion. The judge had weighed the claimant’s recent loss of representation, limited preparation time, personal knowledge of the case, prior legal advice, health, and the unequal positions of the parties against the age of the proceedings and the significant costs that an adjournment would waste. He was satisfied that the claimant could conduct the trial and would receive assistance on legal points. There was no prospect of showing that the discretion had been exercised impermissibly.
2. Right to appeal. The judge was under no duty to tell the claimant that the decision might be appealed. That complaint could not justify permission.
3. Effect of compromise. The claimant later agreed that both sides would abandon their claims and bear their own costs. Nothing indicated that the compromise preserved a right to pursue an appeal against the refusal of an adjournment. Even if the proposed appeal had merit, it would therefore have afforded the claimant no practical benefit.

Permission was accordingly refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Kay LJ refused permission to appeal in [2002] EWCA Civ 1892.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Newcastle upon Tyne District Registry — His Honour Judge McGonigal refused the claimant’s application to adjourn the trial indefinitely.