Sharma v Sunrise Radio Ltd

For a second-tier appeal from a decision made on appeal, permission is required under the Civil Procedure Rules, rule 52.13. Permission is confined to cases raising an important point of principle or practice, or presenting another compelling reason for appellate intervention. A litigant in person is entitled to a degree of special treatment, but an adjournment remains a matter of judicial discretion. It is not justified where the litigant can present the relevant points and further time would not improve their position. A proposed appeal that is legally insubstantial and hopeless should be refused permission.

Sunrise Radio Limited brought an action against Anil Sharma for sums said to be due under an advertising contract. Sharma sought to amend his Defence to add a counterclaim and join the claimant’s managing director. His Honour Judge Goldstein refused the amendment on 16 March 2000 and summarily assessed costs at £3,204.76.

Patten J treated Sharma’s later application as a substantive appeal, dismissed it subject to deleting VAT wrongly included in the assessment, and alternatively refused permission. Sharma then sought permission from the Court of Appeal for a second-tier appeal. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal satisfied the applicable procedural threshold.

Lord Justice Jonathan Parker, giving the sole judgment, dismissed the application for permission to appeal and made no order for costs.

1. The court proceeded on the footing that Patten J had been seised of a substantive appeal from Judge Goldstein’s order. The proposed appeal was therefore a second-tier appeal governed by rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

2. Under rule 52.13, permission was required for an appeal from a decision of the High Court or county court which was itself made on appeal. Permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.

3. The complaint concerning observations made by Park J had no substance. Park J’s note merely assumed possible contingencies, including permission being granted and the costs assessment being reduced. It did not suggest that either contingency was likely.

4. The VAT ground disclosed no possible basis for appeal. The VAT items had been deleted following the claimant’s concession, so Sharma had in substance succeeded on that point.

5. Sharma was entitled, as a litigant in person, to a degree of special treatment. However, the decision whether to adjourn was a matter for Patten J’s discretion. There was no basis for interference: Sharma had been able to make his points, and further time to consider the skeleton argument would not have put him in a better position. Patten J had dealt carefully and thoroughly with the arguments.

6. The proposed appeal raised no important point of principle or practice and disclosed no other compelling reason for a further appeal. It was in any event hopeless. The application was dismissed, with no order for costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 4 February 2002, Lord Justice Parker dismissed Sharma’s application for permission to bring a second-tier appeal. The court made no order for costs. [2002] EWCA Civ 213
2. High Court, Chancery Division — On 14 September 2001, Patten J treated Sharma’s application as a substantive appeal, dismissed it subject to deleting wrongly included VAT from the costs assessment, and alternatively refused permission to appeal.
3. County court — On 16 March 2000, His Honour Judge Goldstein refused Sharma permission to amend his Defence by adding a counterclaim and joining Mr Lit, and summarily assessed costs at £3,204.76.
4. Earlier applications — May LJ had refused permission to appeal against Judge Goldstein’s order. A renewed application concerning payment of the costs by instalments was dismissed by District Judge Silverman and Mr Recorder Merriman, and Lord Justice Parker later refused permission to appeal against the Recorder’s order.