Woodhouse v Consignia plc (Steliou v Compton)

An automatic stay imposed under the transitional arrangements in Civil Procedure Rules Part 51 is a sanction. An application to remove it is governed by CPR rule 3.9. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the relevant listed factors, and must not decide the application solely by reference to delay.

The word will in rule 3.9(1) does not require a mechanistic judgment addressing every factor separately. Judges should nevertheless consider the relevant matters methodically and give sufficient reasons. A renewed interlocutory application based on material that could have been deployed earlier is a material factor, but it is not invariably decisive. The response must remain proportionate and consistent with access to the court.

These conjoined appeals concerned automatic stays imposed by paragraph 19 of the Practice Direction to CPR Part 51.

In Woodhouse v Consignia plc, the widow and administratrix of a deceased employee sought removal of a stay so that a modest employment-reference claim could continue. The Croydon County Court had refused relief, concentrating on the length of delay.

In Steliou v Compton, a seriously injured claimant sought removal of a stay after liability had already been determined and damages remained to be assessed. His later, properly evidenced application was struck out as an abuse because the material could have supported an earlier unsuccessful application.

The common issues were the proper approach to relief from the automatic stay and the effect of a renewed application for the same relief.

1. Both appeals were allowed. The court set aside the orders refusing to lift the automatic stays. In Steliou v Compton, the matter was remitted to the Basingstoke County Court for directions.

2. Following Audergon v La Baguette Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 10, an automatic stay under CPR Part 51 Practice Direction paragraph 19 is a sanction for the purposes of CPR rule 3.9. Relief must therefore be determined under that rule. The application must be supported by evidence under rule 3.9(2).

3. Rule 3.9 requires the court to consider all the circumstances and the relevant listed matters. The word will is directory, so a judge need not separately recite every factor. Nevertheless, particularly where refusal will end a claim without a trial, the judge should consider the relevant factors methodically, carry out the balance, and explain the result. A decision based only on delay risks omitting material considerations and may require the appeal court to exercise the discretion afresh.

4. Access to the court is engaged where a stay prevents pursuit of the claim. The court must act proportionately in accordance with Article 6. A decision made within the framework of CPR rules 3.9 and 1.1 will ordinarily meet that requirement.

5. In Woodhouse, the application was made shortly after the automatic stay took effect. The claim had been commenced promptly, there was no intentional default or prior non-compliance, and refusal would bar the widow’s access to the court. The sparse evidence and the claim’s modest and uncertain value did not justify refusing relief when the rule 3.9 balance favoured allowing the action to continue.

6. In Steliou, the renewed application was a second attempt supported by evidence that should have been used earlier. That fact was important, because parties should not oppress opponents through successive applications. But the Henderson v Henderson principle applies less strictly to a dismissed pre-trial application than to a final decision. Here, the claimant had an unanswerable entitlement to substantial damages, the error was his solicitor’s, the stay had caused no relevant prejudice, and refusing relief would be disproportionate. Costs, rather than forfeiture of the claim, were the appropriate response.

• Court of Appeal: By this judgment, [2002] EWCA Civ 275, allowed both appeals and set aside the orders below.

• Croydon County Court: Judge Coningsby QC, on 29 February 2001, dismissed Mrs Woodhouse’s appeal from District Judge Fink’s refusal on 4 September 2000 to remove the automatic stay.

• Basingstoke County Court: Judge Thompson QC, on 27 April 2001, dismissed Mr Steliou’s appeal from District Judge Fuller’s order of 19 January 2001 striking out his renewed application as an abuse of process. An earlier appeal from the order of 4 August 2000 had also been dismissed on 27 October 2000.