Woodhouse v Consignia plc (Steliou v Compton)

An automatic stay under the transitional provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules is a sanction. An application to remove it falls under CPR 3.9. The court should consider all the circumstances and systematically address the relevant listed considerations. Concentrating on delay alone may justify appellate intervention. Expressly addressing each item separately in the judgment is not mandatory.

A renewed application supported by evidence available on an earlier unsuccessful application is not automatically an abuse of process. The court must weigh the public interest against successive applications alongside the strength of the application and the consequences of refusing relief. The policy requiring parties to present their whole case applies less strictly to unsuccessful pre-trial applications than to final decisions.

Tracey Woodhouse, the widow and administratrix of Mark Woodhouse’s estate, sought to continue his damages claim against his former employer, Consignia plc. The claim concerned an allegedly inaccurate employment reference. Following his death, the proceedings remained inactive and became automatically stayed under the transitional provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules. A district judge refused to remove the stay because of the length of the delay. A circuit judge dismissed Mrs Woodhouse’s appeal.

Martin Steliou had obtained judgment against Ms Compton following a road accident, with damages to be assessed subject to a reduction for contributory negligence. Assessment awaited clarification of his medical prognosis. Those proceedings also became automatically stayed. His first attempt to obtain removal of the stay failed because it lacked supporting evidence, and an appeal was dismissed. A subsequent application supported by evidence available earlier was struck out as an abuse of process. A circuit judge upheld that decision.

The Court of Appeal heard the appeals separately and delivered a single judgment. The common issue was how courts should exercise their discretion to remove a transitional automatic stay. The second appeal also concerned the treatment of a renewed interlocutory application.

Both appeals allowed. Brooke LJ delivered a single judgment of the court, comprising Brooke, Laws and Dyson LJJ. The orders below were set aside.

1. The automatic stay imposed by paragraph 19 of the Practice Direction to Part 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules was a sanction within CPR 3.9. Following Audergon v La Baguette Ltd, applications to remove that stay were governed by the rule rather than the former approach to striking out for want of prosecution.

2. The court should consider all the circumstances and consciously work through the relevant considerations listed in CPR 3.9. That discipline reduced the risk of overlooking a material matter. A judgment need not expressly address each item separately, and failure to follow a particular form did not itself invalidate the decision. Subject to that qualification, the court reaffirmed the structured approach recommended in Bansal v Cheema and Keith v CPM Field Marketing Ltd. Judges should explain their balancing exercise and avoid concentrating on one or two matters, such as delay, to the exclusion of others.

3. Maintaining a stay deprived the claimant of access to the court. Article 6 of the ECHR therefore reinforced the importance of a proportionate decision. Decisions made within the framework of CPR 3.9 and the overriding objective were unlikely to contravene the Convention. Applicants should also provide adequate evidence at the first hearing because an appeal ordinarily involved review rather than a complete rehearing.

4. In Mrs Woodhouse’s case, the district judge had wrongly concentrated on delay. The application followed the automatic stay by only two months. The listed considerations were broadly neutral or favoured allowing the action to proceed. The claim’s modest value, problematic merits and potential costs were relevant, but did not justify barring it in those circumstances. The court exercised its discretion afresh and allowed the appeal.

5. In Mr Steliou’s case, the availability of the evidence at the first application was important but not decisive. The policy underlying Henderson v Henderson applied less strictly to an unsuccessful pre-trial application than to a final decision. The court had to consider the substantive strength of the renewed application, the protection of respondents against oppression and the allocation of judicial resources.

   Liability had been established, substantial damages were due, and the default had caused no prejudice. The solicitor’s mistaken reading of the transitional exception was understandable. Maintaining the stay would deprive the claimant of damages and encourage further negligence litigation against his advisers. Costs provided an adequate response to the procedural error on these unusual facts.

Mrs Woodhouse’s claim was directed to proceed in Nottingham County Court with amended particulars and a case management conference. Mr Steliou’s stay was lifted and his case remitted to Basingstoke County Court for further directions.

• Court of Appeal: In [2002] EWCA Civ 275 , both appeals were allowed by a single judgment of Brooke, Laws and Dyson LJJ. The lower orders were set aside. The Woodhouse claim was transferred to Nottingham County Court for case management. The Steliou proceedings were remitted to Basingstoke County Court with the automatic stay lifted.
• Croydon County Court: Judge Coningsby QC dismissed Mrs Woodhouse’s appeal from District Judge Fink’s refusal on 4 September 2000 to remove the automatic stay. The judge also refused additional evidence and a complete rehearing. Those two procedural rulings were not challenged in the Court of Appeal.
• Basingstoke County Court: On 27 April 2001 Judge Thompson QC dismissed Mr Steliou’s appeal from District Judge Fuller’s order of 19 January 2001 striking out his renewed application as an abuse of process.
• Basingstoke County Court: Mr Steliou’s earlier attempt to obtain removal of the stay failed before District Judge Fuller on 4 August 2000 because it lacked supporting evidence. Judge Thompson QC dismissed the ensuing appeal on 27 October 2000.
• Basingstoke County Court: Following a split trial, Recorder Boyle entered judgment for Mr Steliou on 21 August 1996, with damages to be assessed and reduced by 40% for contributory negligence.