Jayaratne v Clerk of the Parliament & Ors

Appellate intervention in decisions of the Employment Appeal Tribunal is limited to errors of law. Procedural case-management decisions, including whether to require answers to a questionnaire or admit late documents, do not establish an error where no meaningful prejudice is shown. A tribunal may prefer one witness’s evidence to another’s, provided its reasons adequately explain the conclusions reached. Unfavourable or insensitive treatment must be distinguished from treatment caused by racial discrimination. Dissatisfaction with a tribunal’s conclusions, without an objective basis, cannot establish bias.

The appellant, employed as a clerical officer in the House of Lords, complained to an Employment Tribunal that she had suffered racial discrimination during her employment. Her complaints included refusal of full-time work, being required to work while sick, inadequate training, reallocation of duties, inadequate appraisals, racist comments and unfair handling of her grievance.

The Employment Tribunal rejected the complaint on 22 December 2000. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed her appeal. The appellant then applied for permission to appeal, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons and bias. The central issue was whether the lower tribunals had made an error of law or had acted in a manner capable of establishing bias.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal could intervene in a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal only if that tribunal had made an error of law. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was similarly entitled to interfere with the Employment Tribunal only on that basis.
2. Procedural complaints. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the respondents did not need to answer the questionnaire. The late-served documents did not demonstrate any sensible prejudice to the appellant. There had been no proper complaint at the relevant time, and the eight-day hearing included a break which enabled the case to be presented fairly.
3. Reasons and fact-finding. The Employment Tribunal’s extended reasons gave full and adequate reasons for its conclusions on the allegations. In a fact-sensitive discrimination case, a tribunal may resolve conflicting evidence by preferring one witness to another. The tribunal had been sympathetic to the appellant’s treatment and had recognised that she had worked excessive hours, but the question it had to decide was whether the treatment resulted from racial discrimination. Its conclusion that it did not was properly reasoned. The tribunal was also entitled to assess the evidence about racist remarks as it did.
4. Bias. There was no proper foundation for alleging bias against either tribunal. The fact that the appellant could not accept the conclusions reached did not establish that an unbiased tribunal could not reasonably have reached them. Lindsay J was therefore entitled to conclude that the appeal was bound to fail and to dismiss it at that stage.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused permission to appeal on 28 February 2002: [2002] EWCA Civ 305.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Dismissed the appeal from the Employment Tribunal’s decision.
• Employment Tribunal: Rejected the complaint of racial discrimination in a decision entered on 22 December 2000.