Alvand v Secretary Of State For the Environment, Transport and Regions

An extension of time will not ordinarily be granted where delay results from unexplained or unjustified procedural errors by a litigant’s solicitors. A litigant who instructs solicitors remains responsible for procedural mistakes made on his behalf, subject to any remedy against the solicitors.

Ignorance of a procedural time limit is not, without more, a sufficient reason for extending time where the information could readily have been obtained. A disagreement with a planning inspector’s factual assessment does not itself raise an appealable question of law. The proposed appeal must identify an error of law which the inspector was not entitled to make.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against a planning inspector’s decision concerning the character of boundary structures and the refusal to quash an enforcement notice. The proposed appeal to the Administrative Court under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1996 had been lodged out of time.

Scott Baker J refused an extension of time on the papers. Collins J later explained that he could not overturn that decision. The applicant then applied to the Court of Appeal out of time for an extension of time and permission to appeal against Scott Baker J’s refusal.

1. Outcome. The application for an extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused. Permission to appeal against Scott Baker J’s refusal to extend time was also refused. There was no order for costs.
2. The period between Scott Baker J’s decision and the hearing before Collins J was treated in the applicant’s favour because it resulted from a misunderstanding. Nevertheless, further unexplained delay remained before the application was lodged in the Court of Appeal.
3. A litigant who places himself in the hands of solicitors cannot generally disassociate himself from their procedural mistake. The solicitors’ serious delay was therefore attributable to the applicant for the purposes of deciding whether time should be extended.
4. The applicant’s lack of knowledge of the 14-day time limit did not justify the further extension. The relevant information could have been obtained from the Court of Appeal office or a Citizens Advice Bureau.
5. Section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 would have prevented a forbidden second appeal if Scott Baker J’s refusal had been on the merits. However, Foenander established that a refusal to enlarge time was not caught by section 54(4), so that issue would not itself have prevented an appeal.
6. Prashar was treated as authority that section 54(4) applied to planning appeals to the High Court under sections 288 and 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1996. The possible merits of the planning issue did not justify extending time. The disagreement with the inspector’s conclusion appeared principally factual, and any appealable legal issue remained speculative.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for an extension of time and permission to appeal was refused: [2002] EWCA Civ 386.
• Administrative Court: Collins J declined to interfere with Scott Baker J’s refusal to extend time for appealing against the planning inspector’s decision.
• Administrative Court: Scott Baker J refused permission to give notice of appeal out of time, deciding the procedural issue without determining the merits.