Suarez v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A fear of persecution may satisfy the Refugee Convention where one effective motive is a political opinion imputed to the applicant, even if the persecutor also has criminal or personal motives. Whether opposition to corruption conveys a political opinion depends on the conditions in the country of origin and the particular facts.

A clear nexus must exist between the feared persecution and the imputed opinion. Suppression of a witness to prevent exposure of private criminal conduct does not become political persecution merely because state institutions are affected by corruption. Nor can inadequate state protection convert persecution for a non-Convention reason into persecution for a Convention reason.

The appellant, a former Colombian soldier, claimed asylum after allegedly witnessing criminal conduct and a murder involving his commanding officer. He said that the officer and other immediate superiors threatened and attacked him after he protested, and that they would kill him if he returned to Colombia.

The Secretary of State refused asylum under paragraph 336 of the Immigration Rules HC 395. A Special Adjudicator dismissed the appeal, doubting much of the appellant’s account and finding in the alternative that the feared reprisals were intended to prevent exposure of crime rather than to suppress an imputed political opinion. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal upheld that determination.

The appellant appealed under section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. The central question was whether opposition to the officers’ corruption was perceived as a political challenge, so that the feared reprisals were persecution for reasons of imputed political opinion.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Potter LJ delivered the leading judgment. Keene LJ and Sumner J agreed. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had made no error of law in finding that the appellant’s immediate superiors sought to silence a witness to their private criminal activities, rather than to persecute him for an actual or imputed political opinion.

2. A persecutor may act from more than one motive. It is sufficient if one motive is a Convention reason and the applicant’s well-founded fear relates to persecution on that ground. A complaint about criminal conduct may therefore attract an imputed political opinion where it is perceived as an expression challenging governmental authority. The assessment must take account of conditions in the country of origin, particularly where corruption and violence have distorted the boundary between political and private criminal activity.

3. A nexus must nevertheless be established between the persecution and the actual or imputed political opinion. The Court endorsed the case-specific approach in Gomez [2000] INLR 549. Even in Colombia, action intended to preserve economic interests, conceal crime or eliminate a witness is not necessarily political persecution. Courts should not distort the facts by treating every attempt to expose criminality as a political act.

4. On the assumed facts, the perpetrators were renegades acting outside their military functions and contrary to instructions. They feared exposure to higher authority and acted for their own criminal ends. There was no suggestion that the government or senior army authorities approved or were complicit in their actions. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that their concern was the appellant’s knowledge of their crimes, not an opinion attributed to him about the army or government.

5. The possibility that the Colombian authorities might provide inadequate protection could not convert persecution for a non-Convention reason into persecution for a Convention reason. By way of postscript, the Secretary of State was invited to consider whether the evidence of threats and an attack on the appellant’s home justified exceptional leave to remain under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. Court of Appeal: The appeal under section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 was dismissed unanimously. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s determination was upheld.

2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: By a decision dated 31 July 2001 and promulgated on 15 August 2001, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. It held that any risk arose from the appellant’s knowledge of private criminal activities, not from an actual or imputed political opinion.

3. Special Adjudicator: By a determination promulgated on 27 February 2001, the adjudicator dismissed the appeal. She doubted the appellant’s credibility and held alternatively that the alleged perpetrators sought to avoid criminal exposure rather than suppress a political opinion.

4. Secretary of State: On 11 April 2000, the appellant’s asylum application under paragraph 336 of the Immigration Rules HC 395 was refused.