Storozhenko v Secretary Of State For the Home Department

Under the Geneva Convention, political opinion may in principle be imputed and need not be expressed. The assessment focuses on the persecutor’s perception. That possibility does not convert every private complaint against corrupt or abusive officials into persecution for a Convention reason. A claimant who seeks personal redress for an assault, without public campaigning or opposition to state policy, may be pursuing a private grievance rather than expressing political opinion. In claims involving non-state persecutors, state protection is surrogate and must be assessed by whether the home state operates a protective system, not by demanding perfect protection. The appeal failed because the asserted political nexus was artificial, and the evidence did not show that Ukraine had entirely abdicated its protective responsibilities.

The appellant, a Ukrainian citizen, arrived in the United Kingdom with his family and claimed asylum after reporting an assault by a police officer. He alleged continuing threats, attacks and intimidation, and argued that the persecution was based on an imputed political opinion in favour of law and order. The Secretary of State refused the application on 15 August 1997. A special adjudicator dismissed the appeal on 22 December 1998, and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed a further appeal on 10 December 1999. The appellant abandoned his alternative claim based on membership of a particular social group. The central issue was whether his conduct established persecution for reasons of political opinion under Article 1A(2), and whether Ukraine was unable or unwilling to protect him.

1. Appeal dismissed. Brooke LJ delivered the leading judgment. Mance LJ and Simon Brown LJ agreed, making the decision unanimous. The appellant’s account was accepted as credible, but the facts did not establish the required Convention nexus.
2. Political opinion. The court accepted that, in principle, political opinion may be imputed, need not be expressed in words, and must be assessed from the persecutor’s perspective. The court did not attempt to define the full boundaries of the expression. The appellant was a private citizen who had made no public complaint, media statement or campaign against government policy. His conduct consisted of reporting an assault, refusing to withdraw his complaint, and seeking police protection. The persecution arose because local police or their associates did not want him pursuing an inquiry into one officer’s misconduct. On those facts, describing the persecution as based on imputed political opinion was artificial.
3. State protection. The court relied on the surrogate-protection analysis in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 WLR 379. A claimant must show that protection in the country of nationality is sufficiently lacking to establish and operate a system of protection against persecution. Ukraine suffered serious corruption and abuse, but the evidence also showed governmental measures to punish officials, remove corrupt elements and establish human-rights mechanisms. The tribunal was entitled to find that the state had not entirely abdicated its protective responsibilities.
4. Fact-sensitive authorities. The Canadian and Australian decisions relied on by the appellant involved public denunciation, investigation of systemic corruption, or opposition to a corrupt state structure. They did not justify extending imputed political opinion to a private complaint about an individual assault. The court warned against placing more weight on dicta from different factual situations than those dicta could properly bear.
5. Concurring observation. Simon Brown LJ added that rejection of the asylum claim did not necessarily prevent consideration of exceptional leave under Article 3 of the European Convention where there was a real risk of serious harm on return. That observation did not affect the appeal’s outcome.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s determination: [2001] EWCA Civ 895.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 10 December 1999.
• Special Adjudicator dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum on 22 December 1998.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department refused the asylum application on 15 August 1997.