Jones v Williams

Relief from a procedural sanction must be decided by considering the relevant criteria in Civil Procedure Rules 3.9 in context. A judge need not address every criterion mechanically, but must give proper weight to the effect of relief on each party. Where exclusion of a party’s evidence on central disputed events effectively determines the case, particularly strong justification is required. Concerns about delay or procedural default do not displace that analysis, especially where the opposing party has already seen the evidence and the non-compliance is limited. The Court of Appeal may intervene where relevant factors and the effect on the litigation have not been properly weighed.

The claimant brought proceedings seeking a declaration that an oral partnership existed, an account, dissolution and sale of property. The defendant denied any partnership and pleaded that any initial arrangement had been terminated.

Before trial, the defendant served witness statements late. The trial judge refused relief from the resulting sanction and excluded the defendant’s evidence, including his own account of the disputed oral transactions. The claimant then gave evidence alone, effectively determining the case. The appeal concerned whether that case-management decision was justified and whether the matter should be retried.

1. Appeal allowed. The judgment below was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Central London County Court for retrial before a different judge.
2. In accordance with the guidance referred to in Bansal v Cheema, the judge was required to consider the criteria in Civil Procedure Rules 3.9 when deciding whether to grant relief from sanction. The criteria did not have to be addressed mechanically or item by item, particularly because the decision was made during the trial. The judge nevertheless had to give proper weight to relevant factors, especially the effect of relief on each party.
3. The claimant had possessed the defendant’s statements for nearly a week and accepted that, once edited, he would not be disadvantaged. By contrast, excluding the defendant’s own evidence was disastrous: it left the court with only the claimant’s account and effectively decided the case. The additional time required to read the statements was not shown to have materially worsened the timetable.
4. The defendant’s conduct was unsatisfactory, but the material before the court did not establish the broader disobedience of court orders considered in Arbuthnot Latham Bank v Trafalgar Holdings [1998] 1 WLR 1426 and Mealey Horgan Plc v Horgan The Times, 6th July 1999. The failure to explain the further breach did not justify overlooking the consequences of excluding the central evidence.
5. The defendant was permitted to give his own evidence at the retrial, but not to call the other proposed witnesses, whose evidence was unlikely to advance the case and would prolong it. Lady Justice Hale agreed with Lord Justice Buxton’s judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2002] EWCA Civ 897. Appeal allowed; the judgment was set aside and the claim remitted for retrial.
• Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Rich QC refused relief from sanction, excluded the defendant’s evidence and gave final judgment after hearing the claimant’s evidence alone.