Daejan Properties Ltd v Di Palma

An appellate court should not interfere with a case-management decision to refuse an adjournment merely because another decision might have been possible. The question is whether the judge exercised the discretion properly, considered the relevant circumstances, and took reasonable steps to ensure a fair hearing. Relevant matters may include the history and length of the proceedings, earlier adjournments, the reason advanced for delay, the availability of representation, and practical alternatives that would avoid prejudice. Illness must be treated sympathetically, but it does not automatically require an adjournment where the judge reasonably concludes that the trial can proceed fairly. A judge is not required to conduct a party’s case for them, although the opposing party must still prove its claim.

The landlords brought forfeiture proceedings against Margarita Di Palma in respect of long-standing rent and service-charge arrears. The proceedings had been repeatedly adjourned and delayed. On the day fixed for trial, Miss Di Palma sought a further adjournment because of illness, late service of the trial bundle, missing photographs and difficulty preparing her case. It was also reported that her legal aid had been reinstated. The judge offered an adjournment until the following day so that solicitors and counsel could represent her, but she declined and left the court.

Judge Cowell gave judgment for the landlords for arrears, interest and indemnity costs, ordered possession subject to relief, and dismissed the defence and counterclaim. A subsequent claim for sums accruing after the transfer of the freehold was also decided against her. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether refusal of the further adjournment justified permission to appeal.

1. Applications refused. Lord Justice Brooke and Mr Justice Collins refused permission to appeal against both Judge Cowell’s order and the consequential order made by Judge Cooke. There was no basis for pursuing the latter application once the challenge to Judge Cowell’s order failed.
2. The refusal of an adjournment was a discretionary case-management decision. The appellate question was whether Judge Cowell had properly exercised his discretion, not whether the Court of Appeal would have made the same decision. He had considered the lengthy history of the proceedings, previous adjournments, Miss Di Palma’s illness and the need to bring the litigation to trial if it could fairly proceed.
3. The judge was entitled to conclude that the illness did not identify any particular time when Miss Di Palma would be better able to conduct the trial. He also made a practical proposal that the matter should begin the following day, allowing her solicitors time to instruct counsel and represent her. She declined that opportunity and left court. The refusal of the adjournment could not properly be criticised.
4. The judge was not required to conduct the litigant’s case on her behalf. He nevertheless considered the defence, documentary material and claimants’ evidence, required proof of the sums claimed, rejected the allegations against the caretaker, and dismissed the counterclaim. The arrears and possession orders therefore stood, subject to the relief terms.
5. The reference to Housing Act 1996, section 81, did not affect the result. The proceedings had begun in 1993, and re-entry was treated as having occurred on service of the proceedings, so the provision was not directly in issue.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2002] EWCA Civ 963: applications for permission to appeal refused; no order for costs.
• Central London County Court — Judge Cowell: judgment for the landlords for service-charge arrears and interest, with possession subject to relief and indemnity costs. Judge Cooke later ordered payment of sums accruing after 15 July 1996.
• High Court — Laddie J dismissed an application for permission to appeal Judge Cowell’s judgment. Patten J struck out the renewed application concerning Judge Cowell’s order and stood over the application concerning Judge Cooke’s order.