Secretary of State for Works and Pensions v Miah

For the capital rules governing income-based jobseeker’s allowance, a Jobseekers Allowance Regulations 1996 dwelling occupied as the home may, in appropriate circumstances, comprise more than one physically separate building. The decisive question is functional rather than structural: whether both buildings are normally occupied by the claimant as one home, with one used in effect as an annex of the other. Occasional use of a second property, or use of it as a separate retreat or separate family home, is insufficient. The direction that only one dwelling is disregarded prevents separate homes being disregarded twice; it does not prevent a single split-site home being treated as one dwelling. The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent claimed income-based jobseeker’s allowance after redundancy. He and his family occupied two non-adjoining three-bedroom houses, separated by two other houses. One was used mainly for day-to-day family life and the other mainly for sleeping and bathing. Including the second house in the capital assessment caused the claim to fail.

The initial tribunal dismissed the appeal. On 23 May 2002, Social Security Commissioner Bano held that a dwelling could consist of more than one building and remitted the matter. On rehearing, the tribunal found that both houses were normally occupied as the respondent’s home. The Secretary of State appealed on the question whether two physically separate houses could constitute one dwelling occupied as the home under the Jobseekers Allowance Regulations 1996.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed with costs. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused, and there was no order on the respondent’s cross-appeal.
2. Construction of the regulations. Schedule 8 paragraph 1, read with regulation 1, permits a single dwelling occupied as the home to extend across more than one physical building in appropriate circumstances. The words requiring only one dwelling to be disregarded principally prevent separate homes, including a claimant’s separate second home or a partner’s separate home under regulation 88, from each receiving a disregard.
3. Functional test. The question is whether the claimant’s arrangements show one home on a split site, with one house used in effect as an annex of the other. Both buildings must be normally occupied by the claimant as his home. Occasional use of the second building, or its use as a separate retreat or separate family home, is insufficient. The test is functional rather than structural.
4. Context and construction. The housing-cost provisions in Schedule 2 confirmed that the drafter contemplated claims involving more than one dwelling, but their specific exceptions did not resolve whether one home could span two buildings. Comparisons with other social security schemes and Commissioners’ decisions had limited value because the statutory wording differed. The approach in R(SB) 10/89 supported the functional analysis, while CIS/081/1991 did not govern the materially different facts or exclude the possibility.
5. Ward LJ relied additionally on commonsense, fairness, practicality and a purposive construction favourable to relieving hardship. Mance LJ reached the same conclusion independently, noting the unusual but coherent domestic use of the two houses. Nelson J agreed with both judgments. The court did not decide the alternative argument concerning premises impracticable or unreasonable to sell separately, nor the distinct human-rights argument.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). In [2003] EWCA Civ 1111, the court dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal with costs.
• Social Security Commissioner. On 23 May 2002, Commissioner Bano held that a dwelling could consist of more than one building in appropriate circumstances and remitted the case for rehearing before a differently constituted tribunal.
• Unified Appeal Tribunal. On 26 July 2002, the tribunal found that both houses were normally occupied as the respondent’s home. The Secretary of State’s further application for leave was adjourned pending this appeal.
• Initial benefit decision and tribunal appeal. The claim was disallowed because the value of the second house took the respondent’s capital above the prescribed limit. The tribunal dismissed his appeal.