Major v Lamyman

On a first appeal, the appellate court must identify a proper ground for intervention before reversing a trial judge’s decision. It is insufficient that the appellate judge feels that the evidence or reasoning could have been explored more fully. Intervention is justified where the decision was wrong or where it was unjust because of a procedural or other irregularity, as reflected in CPR 52.11(3). A trial judgment need not address every evidential detail. It must identify the issues critical to the result and explain how they were resolved. Where the trial judge has done so, an appellate court should not substitute its own view merely because it would have preferred fuller reasoning or further cross-examination.

The claimant, a tractor driver, sued his employer after injuring his knee while climbing onto a tractor. Judge Machin dismissed the claim in the Lincoln County Court on 5 April 2001, finding that the injury was inconsistent with the claimant’s account and resulted from his failure to watch where he put his feet.

Royce J allowed the claimant’s first appeal and directed a retrial on liability. He considered that the medical evidence might have been explored more fully, but did not find that the county court judge’s decision was wrong or unjust because of procedural irregularity. The defendant sought permission for a second appeal. The central issue was whether Royce J had applied the correct principles governing appellate intervention.

1. Appeal allowed. Permission to appeal was granted because the proposed appeal raised an important point of practice and, alternatively, another compelling reason. Judge Machin’s judgment was restored. The appellant received the costs of the second appeal and the first appeal, subject to legal aid taxation.
2. Under CPR 52.11(3), an appellate court may properly intervene where the decision below was wrong or where it was unjust because of a procedural or other irregularity. Royce J did not expressly or impliedly rely on either ground. His unease that the case might have been dealt with more fully did not satisfy the governing criteria.
3. Judge Machin had adequately explained the result. He accepted the medical evidence concerning the nature of the injury, but was entitled to distinguish that evidence from the claimant’s account of the accident and to permit cross-examination about whether an injury of that severity could have occurred as described. The evidence entitled him to conclude that the claimant’s account was not physically possible and to dismiss the claim.
4. The guidance in English v Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd was not a requirement that every factor in the evidential appraisal be recorded. A trial judgment need identify and explain the matters critical to the decision. Judge Machin had done so by explaining why he rejected the claimant’s account and why he concluded that the accident resulted from the claimant not watching where he put his feet.
5. An appellate court must not reverse a first-instance decision for reasons as thin as those given by Royce J. The Court of Appeal therefore allowed the second appeal and restored the county court judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from Royce J was allowed and Judge Machin’s county court judgment was restored: [2003] EWCA Civ 1701.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Royce J allowed the claimant’s first appeal from Judge Machin and directed a retrial on liability.
• Lincoln County Court: Judge Machin dismissed the claimant’s action on 5 April 2001.