Amica v Rhône-Poulenc Chemicals Ltd

On an application for permission to appeal, a later decision on a legal issue remains relevant to an earlier tribunal decision only if it demonstrates that the tribunal’s reasoning was unsound. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to find equal-pay and related claims out of time, including a Wages Act 1986 claim where the applicant had not shown that it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim in time. A document said to support the claim could not affect the result where it could not have influenced the limitation decision. No arguable basis for appeal was disclosed.

Miss Amica sought permission to appeal four orders of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Two concerned production of a memorandum dated 10 October 1977, including an extension of time. A third dismissed her appeal from an Employment Tribunal decision in Manchester, promulgated on 15 June 1995. The fourth refused a review. Her claims had been brought under the Wages Act 1986, the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. The EAT relied on Preston v Wolverhampton Health Authority & Others [1997] IRLR 233. The central issue was whether any of the challenged orders disclosed an arguable basis for appeal.

1. Permission refused. Lord Justice Pill refused all the applications for permission to appeal.
2. The Employment Tribunal had carefully considered the applicant’s explanations for delay, including the alleged withholding of the memorandum, workplace harassment and fear of repercussions, ill health, and unfavourable advice. It was entitled, as the fact-finding tribunal, to conclude that the claims under the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Article 119 were out of time. It was also entitled to conclude that the Wages Act 1986 claim was out of time because the applicant had not demonstrated that it was not reasonably practicable to bring it in time.
3. The argument that Preston could not be relevant because it was decided after the events in question was rejected. A later decision could be relevant to an earlier decision if it showed that the earlier reasoning was unsound. Following a reference to the European Court of Justice, the House of Lords had decided in Preston that the relevant domestic provisions did not infringe Article 119. That decision therefore did not undermine the Employment Tribunal’s reasoning.
4. The alleged 1977 memorandum could not have influenced the Employment Tribunal’s 1995 decision, given the basis on which that decision was reached. The applicant’s grievance about its non-disclosure was understood, but the disclosure orders could not provide an arguable ground of appeal. The substantive dismissal not being arguably reversible, the refusal to review it was likewise not arguably reversible. The earlier disclosure orders were effectively nullified.

The formal order was: applications for permission to appeal refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Pill refused permission to appeal against the EAT’s dismissal of the substantive appeal, its refusal to review that decision, and the related memorandum orders.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Judge McMullen dismissed the appeal from the Employment Tribunal and refused a review, relying on Preston v Wolverhampton Health Authority & Others [1997] IRLR 233.
3. Employment Tribunal, Manchester: The tribunal’s decision, promulgated on 15 June 1995, treated the equal-pay and Article 119 claims as out of time and dismissed the Wages Act claim for failure to establish that it was not reasonably practicable to bring it in time.