Galli-Atkinson v Seghal

In a secondary-victim psychiatric injury claim, the claimant must have a close tie of love and affection with the primary victim, proximity to the accident in time and space, and direct perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath through sight or hearing. The immediate aftermath is not confined to a single instant. It may comprise an uninterrupted sequence of events, provided sufficient proximity is retained. News of death alone cannot found recovery, but communication may form one part of a sequence that includes direct perception. Expert evidence need only establish that the direct perception made a substantial contribution to the psychiatric illness; it need not be the sole cause.

The appellant’s 16-year-old daughter was killed when the respondent’s car mounted the pavement. The appellant learned of the death at the accident scene, then attended the mortuary and saw and held part of her daughter’s body. She developed a serious psychiatric disorder and claimed damages.

The Recorder dismissed the claim, holding that the relevant shock was caused solely by being told of the death and that the mortuary visit was not part of the immediate aftermath. The appeal concerned whether the events from the accident through the mortuary formed one sufficiently proximate sequence, and whether the psychiatric evidence established that the appellant’s direct perceptions materially contributed to her illness.

1. Disposition. Latham LJ delivered the principal judgment. Wilson J agreed, and Thorpe LJ agreed without adding reasons. The appeal was allowed unanimously, with costs below and the costs of the appeal. There was no order as to the costs of the adjournment or the amendment of the appellant’s notice.
2. Applicable controls. The claim was governed by the control mechanisms developed in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 and Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, as applied under the approach confirmed in Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455. A claimant must show a close tie of love and affection, proximity in time and space, direct perception of the event or its immediate aftermath through sight or hearing, and psychiatric illness induced by the resulting shock. The close-tie requirement was accepted in this case.
3. Immediate aftermath. The court rejected a frozen-moment approach. An accident may comprise several components, and its aftermath may likewise extend through an uninterrupted sequence where the events retain sufficient proximity. The period here continued from the accident until the appellant left the mortuary. The mortuary visit was materially different from the delayed identification visits considered in Alcock: it formed part of the continuing sequence and completed the appellant’s experience of what had happened.
4. Causation. The police officer’s communication of the death was not, by itself, a sufficient basis for recovery. It nevertheless formed part of the immediate aftermath. The evidence of both psychiatrists supported the conclusion that the appellant’s perceptions at the scene and mortuary made a material or substantial contribution to her illness. The Recorder’s finding that the illness was caused solely by the news, or would have occurred in any event, was unsupported by the expert evidence.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal from the Central London County Court, with costs below and on appeal.
• Central London County Court: Mr Recorder Woods dismissed the appellant’s claim for psychiatric injury damages.