Higgs v Brighton and Hove City Council

For priority need under section 189(1)(d) of the Housing Act 1996, the event causing homelessness must be both an emergency and a disaster similar in nature to flood or fire. The concept is not limited to force majeure or natural events. Physical interference that suddenly deprives an applicant of a movable home may qualify, including disappearance of a caravan. The claimant must also show that homelessness resulted from that event. A person already homeless under section 175(2)(b) because there was no lawful place to site and occupy the caravan remains homeless from that earlier cause. Its later disappearance therefore does not establish priority need, even if the disappearance would itself qualify as an emergency. Appeal dismissed.

Scott Higgs lived in a caravan placed unlawfully on council land. The caravan disappeared without trace, and the authority accepted that he was homeless and not intentionally homeless but rejected that he had a priority need under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. The Brighton County Court dismissed his appeal, applying the construction in R v Bristol City Council, ex parte Bradic (1995) 27 HLR 584. On appeal, the authority relied on a respondent’s notice, arguing that Mr Higgs had already been homeless under section 175(2)(b). The central issues were whether the disappearance was an emergency under section 189(1)(d), and whether it caused his homelessness.

Appeal dismissed unanimously. Kay LJ gave the principal judgment. Simon Brown LJ agreed with it, and Waller LJ agreed with the reasons in both judgments. The decision below was upheld on the respondent’s notice, although not for the Recorder’s reasoning.

1. Emergency and disaster. The Court accepted the construction of the equivalent provision in R v Bristol City Council, ex parte Bradic (1995) 27 HLR 584, itself reflecting Noble v South Herefordshire District Council (1983) 17 HLR 80. The event must have the characteristics of both an emergency and a disaster similar in nature to flood or fire. The category is not confined to force majeure or events caused by nature. Human intervention may suffice.
2. Application to the caravan. The unexplained disappearance of a movable home was a sudden and wholly unexpected loss outside the appellant’s control. Its removal was physical interference with the property and deprived him of his home. It was therefore properly characterised as an emergency and disaster similar to flood or fire. This differed from Bradic, where the premises remained available as a home and the claimant was prevented from occupying them by the operation of law. This conclusion on the first issue was legally significant but was not necessary to the final disposal.
3. Causation. Section 175(2)(b) of the Housing Act 1996 made the appellant homeless before the caravan disappeared because he had no place where he was entitled or permitted both to place it and reside in it. His homelessness therefore continued from the earlier circumstances that led him to occupy the unlawfully sited caravan. The later disappearance did not make him homeless, so the requirement in section 189(1)(d) that homelessness result from the emergency was not met.
4. Disposition. The appellant did not establish a priority need. The appeal was dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2003] EWCA Civ 895, the Court dismissed the appeal. It upheld the result below solely on the causation issue raised by the respondent’s notice.
2. Brighton County Court — Mr Recorder Morris-Coole dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the authority’s decision, holding that the loss of the caravan was not an emergency giving rise to priority need.