Chaaban, R. v

A trial judge must balance the interests of the defendant, prosecution, witnesses, jury and the public when managing a criminal trial. An adjournment should be refused unless it is necessary and justified. An appellate court will interfere with that decision only where it was wholly unreasonable and caused real prejudice undermining the safety of the conviction.

The entitlement to a fair trial is consistent with firm, even-handed and flexible judicial control of the timetable. Relevant evidence may be admitted despite late service where it creates no undue difficulty for the defence. Fresh evidence does not render a conviction unsafe where the new witness is not credible or capable of belief.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall of blackmail and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that he acted jointly with his co-accused to blackmail a vulnerable woman using a covertly made video recording. The co-accused pleaded guilty immediately before trial and gave evidence for the Crown.

The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence. He challenged the refusal of adjournments, the trial timetable, evidential rulings, and the adequacy of the direction concerning the co-accused’s evidence. He also relied on alleged fresh evidence from a prison witness said to show that the co-accused had falsely implicated him. The central questions were whether the conviction was unsafe and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

1. The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed. The court held that none of the complaints about the conduct of the trial, the evidential rulings, the summing-up, or the alleged fresh evidence undermined the safety of the conviction.

2. A trial judge has a central responsibility for case management. The judge must balance the interests of the defendant, prosecution, complainant, witnesses, jury and the community’s interest in justice without unnecessary delay. Adjournments must be justified. The Court of Appeal will not interfere unless refusal was wholly unreasonable and caused real, rather than fanciful, prejudice undermining the conviction’s safety. The proposed further enquiries about the envelope were speculative and did not justify delaying the trial.

3. Firm judicial control of a timetable is compatible with a fair trial. A judge may set an expected finishing date and enforce it with appropriate even-handedness and flexibility. No material was identified which the defence had been unable properly to deploy because of the timetable.

4. The cash found at the appellant’s home was relevant evidence capable of supporting the co-accused’s account and the alleged joint enterprise. The camera-shop evidence was also relevant because it supported the case that two men had acquired the equipment used in the blackmail. Although served late, it created no undue difficulty that prevented its admission.

5. The summing-up gave a clear and sufficient warning about the need for caution in assessing the co-accused’s evidence and his possible interest in implicating the appellant. A further express reference to a possible sentence discount was unnecessary in the circumstances.

6. The prison witness’s account was not credible or capable of belief. It therefore did not affect the safety of the conviction. The six-year sentence properly reflected a carefully planned blackmail targeting a vulnerable victim, the breach of trust, and the appellant’s integral role. It was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2003] EWCA Crim 1012: dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence.
• Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall: on 25 May 2001, convicted the appellant of blackmail and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment.