John M, R. v

Fitness to plead is a functional question. An accused is unfit where a disability prevents them from performing an essential practical capacity for trial, including understanding the charge, pleading, instructing lawyers, following proceedings and giving evidence. The accused need not be able to advance a plausible, reliable or objectively helpful case, nor act in their own best interests. A memory deficit does not by itself establish unfitness.

The question is for the jury where there is evidence on which it can decide it. Earlier police interviews may be relevant to present fitness if their limitations are explained. An appellate court will ordinarily intervene in a discretionary ruling under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 only where it is perverse.

The appellant was tried at the Central Criminal Court for sexual offences against a child. Before the substantive trial, a jury determined that he was fit to plead despite evidence of anterograde amnesia and serious short-term-memory impairment. He was then convicted and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

He appealed against conviction, contending that the trial judge’s directions set the threshold for fitness too low and that the verdict was perverse. He also sought leave to challenge the admission, before the fitness jury, of transcripts of police interviews conducted more than a year earlier. The central issues were the correct legal test for fitness to plead and the relevance and fairness of the interview evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed; application for leave to appeal on the further ground refused. The trial judge’s six-part direction correctly reflected the functional test for fitness to plead. Under Pritchard, an accused must be able to plead, understand the course of proceedings sufficiently to make a defence, challenge jurors, instruct lawyers, follow the evidence and, if desired, give evidence. The direction correctly made clear that the accused need not give plausible, reliable or helpful instructions or evidence, and need not be capable of acting in his best interests.

2. The court followed Podola, Robertson and Berry. A loss of memory, or marked abnormality, does not necessarily make an accused unfit if the required trial functions can be performed. The court described the directions as admirable and held that they did not set the threshold too low.

3. By section 4(5) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, fitness is essentially a jury question. The conflicting expert opinions did not displace the jury’s role. Dr Lock’s evidence provided a basis on which the jury could find the appellant fit, and the verdict was not perverse.

4. The 2001 interview transcripts were relevant to fitness. They provided the only detailed first-hand material showing how the appellant answered questions, had informed expert assessments, and could assist on suggestibility and the nature of his memory impairment. Their earlier date went to weight, not admissibility; the jury was properly warned that performance in interview did not necessarily show performance at trial.

5. The trial judge properly balanced probative value and prejudice under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Applying Quinn [1995] 1 Cr App R 480, the court found no perverse exercise of discretion and no basis to disturb the ruling.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2003] EWCA Crim 3452, dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused leave to advance the additional evidential ground.
• Central Criminal Court: On 18 December 2002, a jury found the appellant fit to plead. On 20 December 2002, he was convicted and later sentenced to a total of eight years’ imprisonment.