Rowland, R. v

Under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, the jury must decide whether a loss of self-control was sufficiently excusable to reduce murder to manslaughter. It must apply community standards, while doing justice in the individual case. Personal characteristics, including a mental condition or personality traits, may affect the control society could reasonably expect. The judge must not direct the jury to disregard such a matter as a rule of law. The judge may, however, guide the jury on its proper weight, including that a violent, excitable or self-induced condition is not itself an excuse. Where material psychiatric evidence was omitted because of the former understanding of provocation, and could have affected the jury’s verdict, the murder conviction may be unsafe.

The appellant was convicted of murdering his wife at Newcastle-upon-Tyne Crown Court in 1997. He had admitted the killing and pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of provocation. The jury rejected that partial defence.

Following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the appeal was reconsidered after R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 31. Fresh psychiatric and psychological evidence described clinical depression, anxiety, insecurity and an over-controlled personality which could have affected the appellant’s capacity for self-control. The central issue was whether the absence of that evidence rendered the murder conviction unsafe and what guidance should be given on jury directions for provocation.

1. Appeal allowed. The court set aside the murder conviction, quashed the life sentence, substituted a verdict of manslaughter by reason of provocation, and imposed seven years’ imprisonment.

2. The trial judge’s direction was not open to criticism on the evidence and law then understood. It properly confined the relevant characteristics to the appellant’s physical condition. However, the subsequent clarification in R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 31 meant that the jury could consider characteristics such as clinical depression and relevant personality traits when assessing the degree of self-control reasonably expected.

3. The fresh evidence was material. It described a clinically depressed, anxious and over-controlled person whose long-term traits had been exacerbated by sustained marital stress. It could have affected the jury’s assessment of whether his loss of self-control was sufficiently excusable. In the unusual circumstances of the case, the murder verdict was therefore unsafe.

4. On provocation, the jury must first decide whether conduct caused a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. If so, it must decide whether that loss was sufficiently excusable to reduce murder to manslaughter. The ultimate evaluative question is for the jury. A judge may comment on the weight of characteristics such as jealousy, volatility or violence, but must not direct the jury to ignore them as a matter of law.

5. The Judicial Studies Board specimen direction was an appropriate starting point. Before speeches, the judge should discuss with counsel the alleged provocative conduct, the evidence of loss of control, and all potentially relevant factors bearing on self-control. The direction should then be tailored to the case. Self-induced intoxication remains no excuse.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a Criminal Cases Review Commission reference, the court admitted fresh psychiatric and psychological evidence, allowed the appeal, and substituted manslaughter for murder: [2003] EWCA Crim 3636.

• Newcastle-upon-Tyne Crown Court: On 14 February 1997, following trial before Judge Hodson and a jury, the appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

• Earlier appeal steps: A single judge refused leave to appeal against conviction on 30 June 1997. A renewed application to the Full Court was abandoned on 19 February 1998.