Shanks, R. v

Section 74(3) of PACE is a rule of proof. It does not enlarge the circumstances in which evidence that an accused committed an earlier offence is admissible. Where such a conviction is otherwise relevant to a matter in issue, rather than merely disposition, the accused is taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved.

The court must consider fairness under section 78 and must identify the limited purpose for which the conviction may be used. A conviction confined to possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life at some stage on a particular day does not itself establish an intent to kill a specified person at the later moment of shooting.

The appellant, a doctor and former soldier, was convicted of murdering Victoria Fletcher after a second trial before Jowitt J and a jury at Sheffield Crown Court. He had previously been convicted, at the first trial, of possessing the rifle on the day of the killing with intent to endanger life.

His principal defence to murder was diminished responsibility. He also disputed intent and relied on provocation. The appeal challenged directions which informed the second jury of the earlier firearm conviction and stated that the conviction bound them.

The central issue was the proper evidential effect of the earlier conviction under section 74(3) of PACE, including its relevance to intent and the extent to which the jury was bound by it.

1. Appeal dismissed. The earlier firearm conviction was properly admitted as evidence relevant to the appellant's intent. Section 74(3) of PACE assists proof of an earlier offence; it does not itself make such evidence admissible. The admissibility of a conviction must still rest on relevance to a matter in issue other than disposition, and fairness must be considered under section 78.

2. The first conviction concerned possession of the rifle on 7 May 1998 with intent, at some stage during that day, to endanger life. It was not a conviction for a continuing intent formed when the appellant had brought the rifle back from the Gulf. Nor did it establish that, when he shot Miss Fletcher, he intended to endanger her life or any particular person's life.

3. Jowitt J accurately conveyed those limits. His direction left the jury to decide whether the conviction assisted them on the separate issue whether, when firing the rifle, the appellant intended to kill Miss Fletcher or cause her really serious bodily harm. It did not undermine the appellant's credibility on diminished responsibility or provocation.

4. A previous conviction admitted under section 74(3) is binding unless the accused proves the contrary. The statutory rule therefore answers the appellant's reliance on the general criminal-law objection to issue estoppel stated in R v Humphrys [1977] AC 1. Although the judge did not expressly state the qualification, it was immaterial: the appellant did not seek to prove that the firearm offence had not been committed and had effectively admitted it. The evidence of intent was in any event overwhelming.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appeal against the murder conviction.

• Crown Court at Sheffield At the second trial, before Jowitt J and a jury, the appellant was convicted of murder on 19 April 2000 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

• Crown Court at Sheffield At the first trial, before Holland J and a jury, the jury did not agree on murder but convicted the appellant of possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life.