Clift v R.

Section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 creates a rebuttable evidential presumption that a person previously convicted of an offence committed it. It does not revive criminal issue estoppel. The defendant may still advance a defence, but bears the balance-of-probabilities burden when seeking to disprove matters established by the earlier conviction.

The presumption may apply where a victim of a non-fatal violent offence later dies from the injuries. Section 78 does not permit exclusion merely because the statutory consequence is thought generally unfair. There must be a specific feature making admission unfair in the particular proceedings.

Clift and Harrison were separately convicted of murder after the victims of earlier assaults, for which each appellant had been convicted under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, later died from the injuries. At their murder trials, the prosecution adduced the earlier convictions under section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Clift appealed his murder conviction. Harrison sought a late extension of time to renew an application concerning his earlier section 18 conviction, leave to appeal his murder conviction, and leave to appeal sentence. The common issue was whether the earlier convictions were admissible and, if so, whether they should have been excluded under section 78.

1. The appeal against Clift’s conviction was dismissed. Harrison’s applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal conviction and sentence were refused.
2. Section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes a proved earlier conviction admissible evidence that the accused committed that offence. In a later murder trial following the victim’s death, it relieves the prosecution of proving again matters already established to the criminal standard. The defendant may nevertheless challenge those matters, but must prove the contrary on the balance of probabilities.
3. The provision creates an evidential presumption, not issue estoppel. The reasoning in DPP v Humphrys [1977] AC 1 therefore did not prevent use of the convictions. A later murder conviction does not follow automatically: the prosecution must still prove causation of death and any other elements not established by the earlier conviction, while the defendant remains entitled to advance a defence.
4. Section 78 could not be used to circumvent a clear statutory rule of admissibility because of a general or academic objection to its consequences. Fairness operates for both parties. Neither trial judge identified a specific feature of the evidence or proceedings making admission unfair, and each was entitled to admit the earlier conviction.
5. Harrison’s earlier section 18 conviction was safe. On the sharply opposed factual cases at that trial, a section 20 alternative would not have reflected the real issues and could have disadvantaged him. The later decision to leave manslaughter at the murder trial did not undermine the earlier conviction. The 16-year minimum term was not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed Clift’s appeal against murder conviction. Refused Harrison’s late application to renew leave to appeal his earlier conviction, his application for leave to appeal murder conviction, and his application for leave to appeal sentence.
• Luton Crown Court Clift was convicted in 2002 of wounding with intent under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. After the victim’s death, Saunders J admitted that conviction under section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; Clift was convicted of murder.
• Truro Crown Court Harrison was convicted in 2008 of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. After the victim’s death, Burnett J admitted that conviction under section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; Harrison was convicted of murder and received a 16-year minimum term.