Clark, R v

The common law offence of perverting the course of justice requires an act, or a course of conduct, which tends to pervert justice and is intended to do so. Inaction alone is insufficient. Leaving the scene of an accident and going home, even to avoid immediate testing for alcohol, does not without more conceal evidence or tend to pervert justice. Natural dissipation of alcohol is not an act by the defendant. Removal of a damaged vehicle likewise does not suffice where nothing is done to alter or conceal it and the evidence remains available. The offence must develop incrementally and cannot be defined by uncertain restraints such as seriousness or de minimis principles.

The appellant was convicted at Taunton Crown Court before Judge Gilbert QC and a jury of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.

Following a fatal collision with a cyclist, the Crown alleged that the appellant, having consumed substantial alcohol, drove from the scene and did not report the accident until the following morning. It contended that he thereby removed himself, his alcohol level and his damaged car from police investigation. The trial judge rejected a submission of no case to answer.

On appeal, the central issue was whether that conduct, rather than a mere omission to report the accident, was capable in law of amounting to an act tending to pervert the course of justice.

1. Appeal allowed. The conviction was quashed because the Crown’s case did not disclose conduct capable of constituting the actus reus of perverting the course of justice.
2. Per Lord Justice Tuckey, in the judgment of the court, the offence requires an act or course of conduct which tends, and is intended, to pervert justice. The court applied the definition in R v Vreones 1891 1 QB 360 and accepted, consistently with R v Headley (1995) Crim. L. R. 738, that inaction alone is not enough. Although an omission may sometimes properly be characterised as an act of commission, the prosecution had to identify a qualifying act.
3. The appellant’s departure did not conceal evidence merely because it delayed police access to him while alcohol naturally dissipated. On reaching home, he and the vehicle remained available for investigation. A person is not required to surrender to the police in order to avoid committing this serious common law offence. Applying the approach in R v Murray 75 Crim. App. R. 58, the court held that, without more, his conduct had no tendency to produce injustice.
4. The damaged car had not been altered or hidden. Its removal from the scene did not tend to pervert justice, since the damage remained visible and accident reconstruction remained possible. The case was unlike the attempted concealment of collision evidence in R v Sharpe and Stringer 26 Crim. App. R. 122.
5. The duties imposed by section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did not exclude a possible common law charge. But any failure to report this accident was an omission and could not supply the necessary act. The court further accepted the caution in R v Selvage (1982) 1 QB 372: expansion of the offence must be incremental and compatible with Article 7 of the ECHR. A defendant’s costs order was made, with costs to be determined by the Registrar.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against conviction, quashed the conviction, and made a defendant’s costs order.
• Taunton Crown Court: The appellant was convicted before Judge Gilbert QC and a jury of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.