X (A Woman Formerly Known As Mary Bell) & Anor v O'brien & Ors

Lifetime anonymity injunctions are exceptional. Notoriety alone does not justify restraining publication about a former serious offender. The court must balance confidentiality and the Article 8 rights to private and family life against Article 10 freedom of expression.

Protection may be justified where the information is limited and remains confidential, publication presents a serious and particular risk of harassment or psychological harm, and the claimant’s circumstances are exceptional. Where a child’s identity is inextricably linked with that of the protected parent, effective relief may require protection for both. An injunction may be made contra mundum where that is necessary to make the protection effective.

X, formerly known as Mary Bell, and her adult daughter Y sought continuing injunctions restraining publication of information identifying them, their identities and whereabouts. X had committed manslaughter as a child, later obtained a new identity, and had lived under protective orders since 1984. The claim followed repeated publicity, harassment and forced relocations.

The defendants did not oppose the relief. The Attorney General intervened on the public-interest issues, and the Official Solicitor participated in relation to Y. The central questions were whether the information remained confidential, whether Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the Convention justified protection, how Article 8 was to be balanced against Article 10, and whether lifetime orders could properly be granted to both claimants.

1. Confidentiality. The information sought to be protected was limited to the claimants’ current identities and whereabouts. Although known to some people, it was not generally accessible and therefore retained the necessary quality of confidentiality. Information already in the public domain remained reportable.
2. Convention rights. The evidence did not establish a real risk to life under Article 2, and no Article 3 case arose on the facts. Article 8 nevertheless protected physical and psychological integrity, identity, personal development and mental health. Article 8 had to be balanced against Article 10.
3. Section 12. The requirements of section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 were satisfied. The media had been notified, the information was not generally available, and no specific public interest had been shown in publishing the current identities or whereabouts. The relevant privacy code was inadequate because a single breach would be irreparable and Y’s position was inseparable from X’s.
4. X. The cumulative factors were exceptional: her very young age when the offences were committed, diminished responsibility arising from serious childhood abuse, the passage of 35 years, successful rehabilitation, continuing notoriety, serious risks of harassment and ostracism, and fragile mental health which publicity would seriously worsen. These factors justified protection notwithstanding the importance of reporting the rehabilitation of serious offenders.
5. Y. Although adulthood removed any automatic continuation of wardship protection, Y was innocent, remained closely connected with X, and would inevitably be identified if X were identified. Protecting X while refusing protection to Y would be unworkable.
6. Relief. The balance under Articles 8 and 10 favoured protection. Injunctions were granted until further order against the defendants and persons having notice, exceptionally on a contra mundum basis. Liberty to apply was included, and there was no order as to costs.

First-instance judgment. The judgment refers to earlier wardship and interim injunctions, including the order in re X (A Minor) (Wardship Injunction) [1984] 1 WLR 1422, but determines the present applications independently.