Birmingham City Council v Riaz & Ors

A lifelong reporting restriction order may be made in civil or family proceedings where the protection of private life under article 8 of the Convention decisively outweighs freedom of expression and open justice under article 10. Neither right has automatic precedence. The court must undertake an intense and fact-sensitive proportionality assessment and identify the minimum necessary restriction.

Although lifelong anonymity is exceptional, the existence of statutory reporting restrictions in analogous criminal proceedings does not prevent the family court acting in compelling circumstances. The victim’s age is relevant but not determinative. Serious vulnerability, the private nature of the information, the likely harm from identification, and the public interest in encouraging victims to report abuse may justify lifelong anonymity.

Birmingham City Council sought to extend an existing reporting restriction order protecting AB, a 17-year-old victim of child sexual exploitation, so that her identity would remain protected for life. AB supported the application. The Press Association and Times Newspapers opposed it, relying on open justice and freedom of expression under article 10 and arguing that the court should not create a new exception to the general rule by analogy.

The court considered the relationship between articles 8 and 10, statutory protections for young victims and victims of sexual offences, and authorities concerning lifelong anonymity orders. The central issue was whether the circumstances justified continuing anonymity after AB reached adulthood.

1. The court had jurisdiction to make a lifelong reporting restriction order. The jurisdiction was founded on the Convention rights and was not limited by the fact that AB would shortly attain majority.

2. Articles 8 and 10 were both engaged. Neither article had precedence. The court was required to focus intensely on the comparative importance of the particular rights claimed, examine the justification for restricting each right, and apply proportionality to the facts. Open justice and freedom of expression required close scrutiny, but so did the interference with private life.

3. The court accepted the guidance in JXMX v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 96 that an anonymity order derogates from open justice and must be strictly necessary, but that the court must also protect children and vulnerable parties where justice requires it. The existence of only a small number of reported lifelong anonymity orders did not prevent the court undertaking the required analysis.

4. The statutory protection under section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 expired at majority, as held in R (ota JC and RT) v The Central Criminal Court and others [2014] EWCA Civ 1777. That conclusion did not determine the present application, which depended on the Convention rights and the compelling circumstances of the individual case.

5. Lifelong anonymity remained an exceptional remedy. The warning in Re S (FC) (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47 against creating further exceptions to open justice by analogy was satisfied because the circumstances were compelling. AB was highly vulnerable; identification as a victim of child sexual exploitation was likely to cause serious emotional and psychological harm; there was no public interest in identifying her; and there was a public interest in encouraging victims to report abuse and cooperate with authorities.

6. The balance therefore fell decisively in favour of article 8. A reporting restriction order protecting AB’s identity for her lifetime was made.

First-instance decision. The judgment refers to an earlier judgment in the same proceedings, [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam), but that decision is part of the same litigation and is not separately modelled as a cited authority.