Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council v M & Ors

The inherent jurisdiction may support injunctions preventing an undesirable association where a local authority has reasonable cause to believe that a child is likely to suffer significant harm and no adequate statutory route is available. Reporting restriction applications require an intense focus on the competing Article 8 and Article 10 rights, followed by a proportionality cross-check. Where allegations against individuals are not proved and naming them would risk identifying a vulnerable child, causing serious private-life harm and producing little genuine public benefit, lifelong anonymity may be necessary. Public reporting of the wider issue may remain permissible without identifying the individuals.

Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council brought wardship proceedings concerning a vulnerable young person, Child G, and four associated males suspected of involvement in child sexual exploitation. Interim injunctions and reporting restriction orders had previously been made. Following further evidence, the Council no longer sought substantive injunctive relief and accepted that no findings should be made against the males.

The Council and South Yorkshire Police nevertheless sought lifelong reporting restriction orders protecting Child G, her family and the four males. The Times Newspapers Limited opposed anonymity for the males, relying on open justice and freedom of expression. The central issues were whether the injunctions should be discharged and whether Articles 8 and 10 justified continuing anonymity.

1. Wardship and injunctions. Wardship was an appropriate vehicle for injunctions preventing undesirable associations. The local authority had locus to apply, and the inherent jurisdiction was available because there was reasonable cause to believe that, without its exercise, Child G was likely to suffer significant harm. The statutory alternatives were unavailable or unsuitable on the facts. However, after considering the totality of the evidence, the Council appropriately sought no further injunctions. The interim injunctions were discharged and no substantive injunctive order was made.

2. Unproved allegations. Since no findings were sought or made against the four males, the allegations had to be treated as not having happened. The males were therefore to be treated as innocent of the suspected wrongdoing for the purpose of the reporting restriction application.

3. Articles 8 and 10. The court had to balance the Article 8 rights to private and family life against the Article 10 rights of the press and public. Under section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, particular regard had to be given to freedom of expression and the public interest in publication. The exercise required an intense focus on the specific rights claimed in the individual case, followed by a proportionality cross-check.

4. Anonymity for the males. Five factors carried particular weight: there were no convictions or findings; the interim injunctions had been made without tested evidence and would not continue; criminal proceedings might themselves attract anonymity protection; naming the males risked jigsaw identification of Child G and could deter other victims from reporting exploitation; and publicity could expose Child G to reprisals. There was no, or at most negligible, public interest in naming individuals against whom no wrongdoing had been established. Their Article 8 rights therefore predominated over the press’s Article 10 right to publish their names.

5. Orders. The lifelong reporting restriction orders were granted for Child G, her family and the four associated males. No lesser order would suffice, although the press remained free to report more generally on the case and child sexual exploitation.

First-instance decision. Prior interim orders had been made in the High Court by Keehan J and MacDonald J, as described in the judgment.